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The Shape of Things

THE FRENCH WORKERS ARE ON THE EDGE OF revolt in protest against Vichy's efforts to force them into the Nazi war factories. As a result, Laval's position is becoming doubly precarious. If he persists in carrying out the promises he has made Berlin, he faces a real explosion in unoccupied France, while if he fails to deliver, Hitler is likely to instal some other *Gauleiter* at Vichy. He received a warning a few weeks ago from the obvious Nazi connivance in the Benoist-Mechin plot to oust him. Now he is believed to have been given an absolute deadline: the 150,000 skilled workers he undertook to send to Germany in June are to be recruited and dispatched by November 30 or else. It seems most improbable that he will be able to meet the Nazi terms even with the aid of the 500 Gestapo agents to whom he has shamefully given citizenship rights so that they may the better perform their duties as slavers. For the French workers are determined not to submit. Strikes have broken out in many factories from which "volunteers" were "designated" to present themselves at the recruiting stations. Violent incidents are becoming as commonplace in unoccupied as in occupied France, and there has been rioting between the population and fascist groups such as Laval's *Service d'Ordre Legionnaire*. Moreover, it appears that arms and ammunition are being delivered by parachute in unoccupied France, forcing Vichy to issue a threat that their retention will be treated as a capital offense. We believe that the French will be more impressed by the news that arms are reaching them than by the warning. The distribution of arms and the stepping up of offensive operations such as the devastating British raid on the Creusot works are the best possible means of stiffening French resistance to Vichy and Berlin.

★

WE FEAR THAT DAKAR'S REAPPEARANCE IN the news is due less to the real imminence of an Anglo-American attack than to Nazi propaganda designed to obtain German control of Vichy's colonial defense. The furor began when Berlin tried to manufacture an incident out of the shooting down of a Captain Daillière in an air battle supposedly over French territory. Later it was brazenly admitted by the Nazi radio that this officer

was killed during the course of a reconnaissance flight over the British colony of Sierra Leone. The arrival of American troops in this colony and in Liberia does of course strengthen the United Nations' forces within striking distance of Dakar and does make an attack on that city at least more feasible. But the indications are that the number of American soldiers stationed in West Africa is not large and that their main duty is the guarding of the increasingly important trans-African supply route. Nevertheless, there are sound arguments in favor of the early establishment of a new front in West Africa in conjunction with a renewed British offensive against Rommel. The French colonies cannot be entirely isolated from the anti-Nazi fever which is sweeping the homeland, and with Vichy's prestige approaching its nadir it is by no means certain that a determined attack on Dakar would not swing a major part of the North and West African garrisons to our side. It would then become urgently necessary for the Axis to rush troops to Morocco and Algiers either through France or Spain or both. This would involve an immense extension of lines of communication and would certainly ease German pressure in other theaters of war.

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THE SCALE OF THE JAPANESE EFFORT TO drive our forces out of Guadalcanal is a measure of the vital strategic importance of that island. Our High Command made no mistake in August when it undertook the hazardous task of landing an expedition in the southern Solomons and seizing the almost completed airfield on Guadalcanal. Had that field and the anchorage at Tulagi remained in Japanese hands, the enemy would have been favorably placed for a new push against our supply routes to Australia. Contrariwise, if we can beat back the present counter-attack and consolidate our hold on the southern Solomons, Japan's grip on the string of islands north to New Britain and its bases on the eastern shore of New Guinea will be seriously threatened. That is why a major battle around Guadalcanal appears inevitable. During the past week the Japanese succeeded in landing important reinforcements and attempted to knock out Henderson Field by attacks from sea, land, and air. They came dangerously near success, but our planes have been able to continue operations and are daily adding to their bag of enemy bombers and fighters. As we go to press, both forces seem to be sparring for an opening. There have been several reports of a heavy Japanese naval concentration not far to the north, but its operations seem to be confined to hit-and-run night raids—an indication, perhaps, of unwillingness to expose big ships to daylight attack by American fliers. But as Secretary Knox has warned, it is probable that the maximum Japanese force has not yet been brought to bear. A very stiff fight is still in prospect.

THE CONTROVERSY IN CHILE ARISING OUT of Sumner Welles's statement on Nazi activities in Latin America deepened over the week-end to the point of suggesting a government crisis. The center of the attack continues to be Dr. Barros Jarpa, the Foreign Minister, in whom democratic Chileans see the main obstacle to Chile's joining the United Nations. Dr. Barros, although the most reactionary man in the Rios Cabinet, cannot be called pro-Axis. He is not, for example, to be placed on the same level as his Argentine colleague, Ruiz Guiñazú, whom *The Nation* has denounced since the very beginning as the evil spirit in the diplomacy of Latin America. But the trouble with Dr. Barros is that he gives too much credit to the reports of his Minister in Berlin, his own cousin, who has fallen entirely under the spell of Goebbels and has become convinced that nobody can defeat Hitler. We shall have all kinds of equivocal maneuvers so long as there remains in Latin America a single starting-point for Nazi attack from within. It will go on until a real unification of Latin American foreign policy is achieved. For this reason we welcome the unanimity with which the distinguished Latin Americans who have just created in New York the Latin American Council of the Free World Association advocated the breaking of relations between Argentina and Chile and the Axis.

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AS WE WRITE, THE HOUSE AND SENATE ARE about to adopt the conference report on the tax bill—more than nine and a half months after the President first urged a sharp increase in taxes to meet the war emergency. The bill is thoroughly unsatisfactory. The total yield is estimated at \$6,881,000,000 as compared with the \$8,700,000,000 originally requested by the Treasury—a request that was later advanced to approximately \$13,000,000,000. Although it has been revealed in a recent study that nearly all of the \$48,000,000,000 of excess spending power existing in the country is in the hands of individuals and families with incomes of more than \$1,750 a year, a large part—probably at least a third—of the revenue to be raised by the new bill will be derived from incomes of \$1,750 and under. The yield from corporation taxes will fall far short of the sum asked by the Treasury. No step was taken to remedy the shocking injustice of tax-exempt securities. The so-called victory tax, adopted as an alternative to a graduated spending tax which would have fallen largely on the higher income groups, is essentially a poor man's tax and will cut seriously into subsistence needs of families with incomes of less than \$1,500 a year. Since the tax bill does not strike heavily at the principal accumulations of excess spending power, it cannot be regarded as an effective anti-inflation measure. The task of restricting spending—the chief responsibility before Congress today

—has been shamelessly dodged. We hope that voters will bear this in mind when they go to the polls on November 3.

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A JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO government agencies, both headed by business men, is hindering the collection of industrial scrap. For many months the Special Projects Section of the War Production Board's Conservation Division has been charged with uncovering large sources of scrap—abandoned railroads, derelict factories, and so on—the salvaging of which would normally be uneconomic. But having no funds it could only do the preparatory work, and in cases where the demolition and other costs exceeded the ceiling price for the scrap which could be obtained it had to find some other government agency to finance the job. To meet this difficulty the ubiquitous Jesse Jones two months ago organized War Materials, Inc., and supplied it with RFC funds so that it could act as agent for the Metal Reserve Company in buying and collecting scrap material. Headed by J. M. Hopwood, a Pittsburgh business man, it prepared to take over the whole job, only to find itself treading on the toes of the Special Projects Section. This agency took the view that it should continue to function as before and that War Materials should confine itself to financing the schemes it prepared. Its stand was supported by Donald Nelson, and Mr. Hopwood resigned, together with his chief aides. The resulting deadlock has still to be resolved. Common sense suggests that the two agencies ought to be merged in order to prevent overlapping, but to make this solution effective it will probably be necessary to bring in new blood at the top. We are inclined to sympathize with the unofficial WPB belief that Mr. Jones's passion for guaranteed titles is likely to prove a fatal obstacle to many of these special projects. On the other hand, Lessing Rosenwald, head of the WPB Conservation Division, is hardly the man to "bull" them through. For while the current scrap campaign has been a success, its inauguration was delayed until the situation became critical.

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STORIES ABOUT THE RACE PROBLEM ARE being censored, and British correspondents in this country have even been prevented from cabling a speech by Wendell Willkie on the subject. Yet while we thus attempt to conceal the worst skeleton in our democratic cupboard, a minority of American soldiers are attempting to introduce color discrimination into Britain. A handful of unreconstructed British imperialists—the kind that we are given to lecturing—share the Southern American attitude toward the Negro, but the vast majority of our allies regard Jim Crow practices as hateful and undemocratic. The British have welcomed black American soldiers as warmly as they have white. They

are impressed by their smartness and discipline, by their good manners and their cheerfulness, and they see no reason why they should not welcome them into their homes, drink with them in their pubs, and carry on normal social relations with them. When, therefore, a Southern white soldier, seeing a Negro dancing or walking with an English girl, feels called upon to "protect" her by socking his fellow-citizen, the British are outraged. There have, unfortunately, been numerous incidents of this nature, leading on occasion to free fights, with British soldiers and civilians siding with the Negroes. We are aware that Southern prejudice is a deep-rooted and stubborn weed, but if considerations of courtesy are insufficient to prevent such attempts to force unwanted customs on our British hosts, then the problem should be dealt with as a matter of military discipline. An army which allows race feuds to develop within its ranks is little better than a rabble. If he has not already taken action, General Eisenhower ought to issue stringent orders forbidding any interference with fraternization between colored troops and the British and should be prepared to break any subordinate officer who fails to see that they are carried out.

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THE BOLD AND PERTINENT SPEECHES OF the American Labor Party's candidate for governor of New York have increased his stature to the point where a vote for Alfange need not be merely a vote against Dewey or Bennett; it can be a vote for Alfange. He has produced a ten-point creed for a war-time governor, and its unequivocal principles contrast sharply with the vapory approach of his opponents. Such a governor, he says, "must preserve labor's Magna Charta and the New Deal's social gains and hold them before the people as an example of the goals for which we are fighting; he must plan, now, a complete program of public works and improvements to be set in motion immediately after the war to keep our people fully employed at a high standard of living; he must crack down without mercy upon those racial and religious bigots who constitute a menace to our national unity; . . . he must place the most capable citizens available in every important post, be they Republicans, Democrats, Laborites, or independents." There are other provisions equally vigorous, among them the pledge that he will "insist that every city, town, and village, every man, woman, and child, shall fight a total war on every front." Against this strong stuff we must set Dewey's plea for election on the ground that reactionaries have captured the Democratic Party in the state and that a "progressive" like himself is needed to aid the war effort. Mr. Bennett so far has said hardly more than that the President has indorsed him and he is therefore sure to win. We doubt that Mr. Farley will allow him to go much farther than that. There are excellent reasons for voting for Dean Alfange, which

will be more fully discussed in our next issue, but not least of these is the grasp of political realities which he has demonstrated in his campaign.

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WE HAD HOPED THAT OUR GOVERNMENT would cheat the Nazis of some of their victims by rescuing, with or without benefit of visas and other rubber stamps, the thousands of anti-fascists in France, Jews and non-Jews of all nationalities who have managed to escape the Nazi net. Instead these people have been deported to the east and elsewhere to become slaves for Hitler. About 8,000 children were left behind when their parents were deported from France. Many lack identification papers and are crowded into orphanages and camps. In a rather belated gesture the State Department has now offered to let 5,000 of these children come to the United States to be cared for by private agencies. Laval has accepted the offer for reasons that are easy to guess. Some of the children, according to one account, are "physically unable to stand the strain of a long voyage and may undergo special treatment before leaving." One dispatch from Vichy estimated that 50,000 Jewish children are "isolated throughout Europe." We are glad that at least 5,000 of them are to be saved.

How to Ration Our Man-Power

THE hearings in the House and Senate on the bill for drafting youths of eighteen and nineteen have produced a wealth of information on man-power but have done little to ease the minds of those who fear that this crucial problem is being badly bungled. Secretary Stimson revealed for the first time that plans are being laid for an army of 7,500,000 men by the end of 1943. This is a considerably smaller figure than had been suggested by various spokesmen, official and unofficial, in recent weeks. But with Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel included, the total for all services will be approximately 9,500,000 by the end of next year. While no recent figures have been issued showing the number of men now under arms, it is believed to be in the neighborhood of 5,000,000. Thus, the total at the end of 1943 would be nearly twice the present number.

Our military and naval authorities are doubtless correct in insisting that they will need this many men to carry on offensive campaigns in Europe and Asia and to give protection to our outposts in all sections of the world. Undoubtedly they would prefer to have more. But the public would have a great deal more confidence in the army's program if there were grounds for believing

that the decision had been reached after full consideration of the political and economic factors which must enter into any decision of high strategy. Presumably the army is convinced that its greatly increased supply needs can be met despite the withdrawal of another 4,500,000 men from industry, agriculture, and the professions. But have our lend-lease obligations been taken fully into account? Is it likely that there will be enough ships in 1943 to move six or seven million men overseas, keep them supplied, and at the same time meet the increased shipping requirements of Russia, Britain, and China? Were the military leaders of these countries consulted in a decision that obviously concerns them as vitally as it does this country? Were our own industrial, shipping, and agricultural leaders consulted, and the chiefs of the WPB, and did they agree that the supply needs of the United Nations could be maintained in the face of this prospective drain of man-power? Doubts arise because the army has given the impression that it considers any interference an impertinence. With the supply of man-power at our disposal definitely limited, basic decisions regarding its distribution should be made only after full consultation with both civilian and military authorities.

Evidence that such consultation has not occurred may be found in the increasingly grave shortage of workers in agriculture and in certain industrial areas. The army's zeal in providing for even remote contingencies in its man-power demands contrasts with the apparent negligence of the WPB and the War Manpower Commission in laying plans to meet the production crisis. Recent surveys in Baltimore and other war-industry centers indicate that the "volunteer" system has broken down completely. Only a small fraction of the workers qualified for skilled jobs in war work but now employed in non-essential work are being shifted to war jobs by existing placement machinery. Little is being done to train women or to develop day care for children so that married women can seek jobs. The President declared in his address of October 13 that we must "learn to ration man-power," but he failed to suggest specific action.

It is not enough simply to say that we must draft men for the civilian front in exactly the same way that we do for the military front; we must take immediate steps to set up a comprehensive program capable of meeting man-power needs in order of their urgency. This is not a matter that can be settled by rushing a bill through Congress. Many months will be required before men and women can be trained and shifted into essential work in appreciable numbers. Yet General Hershey has announced that over a million more men will be taken out of civilian life before the New Year. Does not this impose a much greater urgency than Washington's actions indicate? Since it is a problem involving major political, economic, and military decisions, the responsibility clearly rests with the President.

Jeffers Packs the Jury

MANY ingredients besides rubber go into the making of a tire. One of the most important is cotton. Experiments in recent years indicate that rayon may make a better fabric for tires. This seems especially true of heavy-duty tires and tires made of synthetic rubber. Both types heat up much more than regular tires, and rayon fabric seems to be able to resist temperatures under which cotton gives way.

Mr. Jeffers, the new rubber administrator, wants to expand facilities for making rayon. The Senate Agriculture Committee, which is largely dominated by cotton planters, fears that new rayon plants would pay off their capital investment on their war business and emerge into the post-war period debt-free and able to sell rayon so cheaply that it would compete with cotton. "As I see it," Jeffers told the committee, "our job is to win this war and stop worrying about what may happen afterward." With this, which should be one of the basic slogans of the war effort, we are in complete agreement. Unfortunately Jeffers, like most WPB officials, shows little readiness to apply the principle to industry as well as agriculture.

Jeffers is not the first WPB official to adopt this slogan in speeches and statements. The test of Jeffers will come in the way he applies it. "Cotton Ed" Smith, senior Senator from South Carolina, asked Jeffers about the charge that seven of the nine WPB officials who had a hand in the decision to expand rayon facilities "have financial interests either in rayon companies or big tire companies." Apparently this is true; Jeffers did not deny it. He took refuge in rhetoric. He said that while he understood that "former officials" of rayon companies participated in the decision, he assumed that "during a war . . . America can trust Americans." If by this he means that Americans of all classes want to do what they think necessary to win the war, no one will dispute it. Lamot du Pont wants us to win the war; so does Senator Smith. But obviously they disagree on what is necessary. A du Pont dollar-a-year man is apt to have a different opinion from a cotton planter on the need for rayon in winning the war.

We are inclined to believe that in this case the du Pont dollar-a-year man is right, the cotton planter wrong. But the cotton planter will have more confidence in Jeffers, and Jeffers himself is more likely to make the right decisions, if he does not depend on one-sided councils. There are distinguished farm chemists concerned with methods of improving and widening the use of cotton, as there are farm chemists concerned with finding new ways to turn surpluses of grain into new fuels, plastics, and synthetics. One suspects that in the case of fabric for tires, as in that of raw materials for

synthetic rubber, WPB consultants drawn only from industry and Eastern scientific schools dependent on big business are not too interested in finding new war uses for farm products. This does not mean that they are dishonest; it does mean that they are human.

The democratic way and the sensible way to meet this problem is to make sure that all sides get a fair hearing, and that decision-making bodies are representative. By this standard, the staff of six technical assistants chosen by Jeffers is disappointing. The only academic scientist of the six is from M. I. T. There are two men from machinery companies. The other three men are from three of the Big Four rubber-tire companies—Firestone, United States Rubber, and Goodyear. Goodrich, the most advanced of the Big Four in making synthetic-rubber tires, is not included; it is "in the doghouse" for its temerity in developing a Buna rubber tire of its own over the veto of Standard Oil and I. G. Farben. None of the smaller rubber companies are represented, although some of them, like Acushnet Process, have shown more enterprise and ingenuity in handling synthetic rubber than the Big Four. There is no man among the six from the Middle Western college and government laboratories, which have done more work on synthetic rubber and learned more about it than the big Eastern scientific schools. The lopsided technical staff chosen by Jeffers follows the customary and discredited WPB pattern rather than the democratic one. Jeffers, like most WPB executives, has provided himself with a packed jury.

Hapsburg Hopes

BY FRED A. KIRCHWEY

AMERICAN diplomacy is a mixture of traditionalism, caution, and pragmatism. The third element occasionally conflicts with the other two, but more often it fits well enough, and together they serve as a complete bar to the development of a flexible political strategy based on a consistent political policy.

Our continued relations with Vichy provide a perfect illustration of this compound in action. Ever since the fall of France we have acted upon the fiction that we were dealing with a sovereign power capable of conducting an independent foreign policy. The pragmatic basis of this bit of theater was our hope that we could actually prevent the full political surrender of Vichy to Hitler. The hope was an illusion. But perhaps that is beside the point. Even if our policy had served as a deterrent on Vichy, it would still have ignored more important strategic considerations—chief among them the absolute need of building up the spirit of resistance in France against both the German occupation and the Vichy regime and of increasing the military and political strength of the

Fighting French. The half-hearted attempts of the State Department to support Vichy and De Gaulle at one and the same time have proved ineffective; as a consequence neither the ends of tradition and caution nor of pragmatism have been served.

At any moment now the policy will be abandoned. Vichy's successive capitulations to Hitler have dynamited the façade of French independence and robbed the State Department of its last area of diplomatic maneuver. Today the only limits on Laval's servility are those established by the French people themselves. Not in Washington's appeasement but in the refusal of the workers of France to be sold into slavery by the government we have appeased lies the one obstacle to the full surrender of Vichy to Hitler. By giving Vichy our encouragement and material support we inevitably strengthened the hand of Laval; it will take many dead French patriots to wipe out the effects of that policy.

But Vichy is only the most obvious and striking example of our diplomatic insulation against the revolutionary challenge of Hitler's war. The traditionalists of the American State Department, by habit and persuasion, shun the reality of revolution. They hope to win the war without using—or loosing—the forces of democratic resistance; they hope to defeat fascism with near-fascism, or at least with the vestigial remnants of pre-war conservatism. Hence their obvious partiality for the Pétains, their anxious wooing of the Francos, their long appeasement of Castillo, their endless back-stairs whisperings with the representatives of clerical reaction. Nor are these efforts confined to Europe and Latin America. Here at home the patient, futile maneuvers go on before our eyes. Under a studied pretense of indifference and impartiality, the State Department has encouraged the most conservative elements among the exile groups.

The one partial exception is the case of the Italians. Attorney General Biddle's decision to exempt Italian nationals in this country from "enemy-alien" status was a shrewd move. It not only recognizes the loyalty to America of the great majority of Italians living here. It also tends to deepen the feeling that Italy is in fact occupied territory rather than a full Axis partner and so to increase the growing unrest in Italy and widen the breach between that country and Germany. The danger lurking in this move is that it might lead toward a softening of American animosity toward Mussolini and the fascist regime. Appeasement of the Italian dictator went on right up to the hour of the "stab in the back," and it would not be hard to revive the attitude of tolerance which prevailed in many official circles. Or, since Mussolini is now a somewhat deflated hero, that sentiment might be shifted to the Italian royal house, which, in this country, has never been held in the contempt it deserves. It is important to make sure that Mr. Biddle's

generous gesture to the Italians in America will be used to strengthen their resistance to fascism as well as their loyalty to the United States.

The best hope that this may happen lies in the rather puzzling approval bestowed by the State Department on Count Sforza and the Free Italy movement which he leads. Whether his noble antecedents or his aristocratic charm are responsible for this attitude or whether he appears the least dangerous leader the Free Italians could choose is hard to say. The happy fact remains, however, that Sforza is a democrat and a statesman, and as long as his leadership is, however informally, acknowledged by the State Department, no revival of appeasement is likely.

But for one Sforza there are a dozen favored "free" leaders whose credentials are of a dubious color. Take, as an example, Otto of Austria. Without any doubt Otto heads a mixed field of candidates for the leadership of the anti-Nazi Austrians in exile. His stock in Washington has been going up fast, and some informed persons believe that a Free Austrian legion headed by Otto will soon receive some sort of "unofficial" approval in official Washington.

Why not? By State Department standards Otto is the almost perfect candidate. His ancestry inspires official confidence; his charm is admitted by his enemies; he is a good Catholic; he dislikes Hitler; he advocates a "democratic" Central European federation. He has described this future federation in a recent issue of *Voice of Austria*; and the fact that its outlines and structure bear a curious resemblance to the Austro-Hungarian Empire lately ruled by his great-grand-uncle is not likely to disconcert those responsible for our present diplomacy. On the contrary. Otto fits into the conservative, clerical, restored "old order" envisaged by these officials as smoothly as if he had been designed by Adolf Berle.

From the pragmatic point of view, however, the idea has flaws. We may ignore the effect it would have on democratic elements here and abroad. We may dismiss the bitterness it would arouse among Austrian democrats, who would consider it a new proof of the State Department's cynical determination to insure the future against a real application of the Four Freedoms or any other democratic nonsense. But the emotions of ordinary people are beyond the concern of diplomats. What might give them pause is the effect Otto's elevation would surely have on several of the governments-in-exile—especially the Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslav and Polish governments. Whereas the State Department's unhappy flirtation with Tibor Eckhardt, the Hungarian reactionary and ex-terrorist, was an affront to the democratic sensibilities of our Eastern European friends, its support of the Austrian archduke would have weightier consequences. No amount of charm will induce states

that once suffered the Hapsburg yoke to look with favor on Otto's claims to leadership. And his plans for a federated Central Europe are equally suspect. Any indorsement of Otto—open or sub rosa—would be taken as an unfriendly act and would seriously injure our relations

with our allies-in-exile. This may seem intolerant and unreasonable to Otto's sponsors, but it is a simple fact. And it is a fact that should be considered by the pragmatists of the State Department before they decide on the resurrection of the Hapsburg dynasty.

Willkie and F. D. R.

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, October 18

WENDELL WILLKIE'S trip abroad has not increased his popularity at the White House, where there is an uneasy feeling that he may have launched the 1944 Presidential campaign from Moscow and Chungking. Permission to make the trip was given reluctantly by the President, after much coaxing by Willkie. Willkie's remarks in Moscow and Chungking were not only unauthorized but resented. Mr. Roosevelt seems to regard the Moscow statement on the second front as an attempt by Willkie to prod the hand that sent him abroad in an army bomber.

The White House, while properly grateful for Willkie's services in demonstrating national unity at home and abroad, senses that he is anxious to keep himself in the public eye. The fourth term is still undecided. Those around the President are not too anxious to see strong, popular alternatives develop, whether outside the Democratic Party or within it. At the moment the only possibilities for progressives are Willkie and Wallace. While Wallace stays loyally and dutifully in vice-presidential obscurity, Willkie is engaged in unorthodox maneuvers. The Administration does not have to move much farther right or Willkie much farther left to reverse their relative position in 1940. Big business could not have a firmer grip on the war economy under Willkie than it has under Roosevelt.

Willkie is playing a daring game. He believes that he long ago made himself unacceptable to Old Guard Republican leaders and that his only hope is to strike out boldly for a popularity that will force them to support his candidacy in 1944. He has cut loose from party moorings, turned his back on the country-club set, and invaded Roosevelt territory. His hunch is that by 1944 there will be much dissatisfaction among workers, farmers, and small business men which can be capitalized by a newer and younger figure prepared to outbid a moribund New Deal for their favor. The Commonwealth and Southern executive who once thought the SEC a nest of commissars has gone a long way in the opposite direction. It is a good thing that Roosevelt was elected in 1940, and, in another sense, it is a good thing that

Willkie was defeated. The latter has learned much in defeat that would not have occurred to him in victory, and progressives who have spoken with him in recent months report many changes in his patterns of thought. At the very least, Willkie's course should increase the bargaining power of labor and the left in dealing with Roosevelt. For some time the President has felt that he had labor and the left so securely in his political pocket that he could concentrate on wooing the right, a process in which the New Deal has been so slicked up as to become almost unrecognizable.

Within the Administration the dwindling hopes of the New Dealers rest on Leon Henderson. No one else shows either the courage or the capacity to provide them with leadership in their fight against the coalition of Wall Streeters, dollar-a-year men in uniform, and political-minded generals who have taken over war production. Recent shifts have left Donald M. Nelson a ludicrous figure; the armed services and their banker allies are in control of the WPB. A principal figure is Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general of the War Department's Services of Supply.

General Somervell is shrewd, ambitious, and subtly arrogant. He is good at internal Administration politics, knows how to play up to the press, and is not unaware of the uses of social demagoguery. He is a kind of American von Schleicher, though unlike his German analogue he is reaching out for alliances on the right rather than the left. At a recent meeting of the War Production Board, where General Somervell has been cock-of-the-walk, Henderson very plainly told the General that the war-production program was supposed to be run by the War Production Board, not General Somervell, and that he, Henderson, was getting tired of having the board bossed around by the General. General Somervell, so the story goes, said he was pretty tired himself of hearing Henderson "pop off," and Henderson suggested that if the General was tired he could leave.

Henderson, with some of the load of price control now lifted from him, has about decided to turn his at-

tention again to production matters, a sphere from which the Knudsen crowd began to ease him in the summer of 1941 when he tried to hasten curtailment and conversion of the automobile and other civilian industries. He will have to go to the mat with General Somervell, and if he does he will have the Senate Small Business Committee rooting for him. General Somervell made an unpleasant impression on the committee during the past week by his contemptuous attitude on the witness stand, his juggling of figures, and his disingenuous answers.

The committee might have spent its time questioning the directors of the new Smaller War Plants Corporation, which promises to be as big a failure as its predecessor organizations in giving little business a part in the war program. The SWPC, like its forerunners, is dependent on army-navy procurement officers, who still do the actual letting of the contracts. The committee therefore declined to have its attention distracted from essentials and decided instead to call General Somervell and the supply-service procurement officials subordinate to him. It took New York City as a specimen case and found that from 70 to 85 per cent of the war orders sent by Washington to the district ordnance office in New York for placement were secretly earmarked for manufacturers already making those items. Senator Mur-

ray asked Colonel Robert Wood Johnson (of Johnson and Johnson, the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals) whether any investigation was made "as to whether or not there would be other concerns that would be capable of taking those extended orders . . . rather than pile them up in the same concern?" "I should say usually not," was the unwilling answer.

General Somervell appeared before the committee next day and sought to repair the damage done by Colonel Johnson's admissions. He presented a series of elaborate but deceptively incomplete charts designed to show that more contracts were going to small concerns. When Senator Murray brushed these charts aside and declared "the substantial part of the [war] production is being carried on by a limited number of large concerns," Somervell confessed, "That is right." The General annoyed the committee by saying that little business did not want war orders and by denying that the army had difficulty in getting big businesses like the large automobile companies to go into war production. Later General Somervell explained that he only meant "we had no difficulty in getting the automobile industry to take their part of the orders for automobiles." This patriotic readiness to sell automobiles to the army as well as civilians failed to impress the committee.

The Services Have Learned

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

THERE are at least two main standpoints from which to gauge the degree of our success in the war to date. From the perspective of the past we are doing a fine piece of work. In no previous conflict have we moved so rapidly and efficiently. But if we consider the task we face, our accomplishments seem less impressive. We became the ally of nations already losing and the foe of some of the ablest military peoples and leaders known to history. Our initial blunders in the Pacific still further weakened our prospects. Finally, our administrative bungling in the field of vital materials, the constant effort of many and diverse interests to use the war emergency to gain their selfish aims, the persistence of race discrimination, the bickering between army and navy and among the various members of the United Nations must all be seen in the light of a desperate struggle for existence.

Fortunately, in the United States the services have shown far more ability to profit by their own blunders than has been the case with the British Army. Air force, army, and navy have all come a long way since December 7.

Maintained as it was in at least theoretical readiness for war at any time, the navy's problem was easier than that of the army. While it has doubled in man-power and greatly expanded its patrol activities in the Atlantic and its support of bases in the Pacific, its striking power has not been greatly increased, since most of the new ships in service are anti-submarine craft of various types. The greatest accretion to its strength derives from the unannounced but very probable completion of four new 35,000-ton battleships, sister ships of the North Carolina. Eight new light cruisers have compensated for the loss of four heavy ones. New destroyers and submarines have far exceeded sinkings. Like Japan, we suffer from a shortage of plane carriers, which are as necessary as they are highly vulnerable. The first carriers of a gigantic new program are still months short of completion.

In the fighting of the past year the navy suffered disgrace at Pearl Harbor, was roughly handled at the beginning of the Aleutian campaign and in the Java Sea, and was soundly beaten in a night battle in the Solomons. To its credit are a little better than a drawn battle in the Coral Sea, the brilliantly managed though lucky victory

at Midway, and a far more successful war of attrition by airplanes and submarines than the Japanese have been able to conduct. No longer is the opponent so outrageously underestimated as in the days before the war, and the navy has thoroughly learned the lesson of air power.

From other angles the picture is not so bright. For a hundred years the navy has managed to exist under a bureaucratic organization which has been a continued and deserved target for critics. Some improvements have been made since the beginning of this war, but the thorough reorganization needed was abandoned a few months ago in favor of piecemeal change. It has not been reassuring to see several officers of proved incompetence promoted rather than purged. The slowness with which losses have been acknowledged even when they are perfectly well known to the enemy, as in the fighting around Java, and the paucity of information given out are also mistakes. The details of plane losses and ship damage at Pearl Harbor are certainly known to the Japanese at this late date and are no longer of great importance. As long as the American people are needlessly denied information of this type the suspicion is certain to be present that the Navy Department is suppressing news to conceal blunders. Over-confidence of people in our war effort can also be a danger.

The army started the war much less ready for action but with the great psychological advantage over the navy of knowing its own weaknesses and the necessity for improvement. As a result it has gone through a process of expansion and reform which has been nothing short of revolutionary. The way for this was paved by a reorganization of the War Department over a year ago which appears to have cut through a good deal of red tape and eliminated much duplication and waste motion. The strongest, best cared-for, best educated personnel of any army on earth has been toughened up to the point where it outmatches the formerly amazing endurance achievements of the German troops. Lack of equipment is no longer a problem. The lesson of air-land coordination appears to have been learned, and the United States has made at least as much progress as other nations in the development of special-purpose troops. Fourteen armored divisions are now in existence. A large influx of new blood in the commissioned ranks has had a wholesome effect. The army still has serious faults and is not yet a completed product, but in its essential modernity and fighting spirit it is enormously stronger than it was a year ago.

Our record in the air has been steadily improving. In the Philippine Islands even more than at Pearl Harbor the surprise and destruction of the army planes on the ground was a national scandal. But these mistakes have not been repeated, and the worst that can be said of the Air Corps' recent record in Europe is that our fliers have

not yet undergone the acid tests passed by the R. A. F. Meanwhile, the box score of planes destroyed in both the Pacific and the European theater of war has favored the United States by so wide a margin as seriously to embarrass the air extremists, who have had to account for marked successes attained under a system of air-force administration which they deplore. This group has also been responsible for a popular but incorrect impression that Midway was a victory of land-based over carrier-based air power, an interpretation which any close study of the available facts will refute.

The rivalry between the army and navy over credit for Midway illustrates a persistent weakness which has not yet been solved—inter-service jealousy and non-cooperation. Pearl Harbor turned a floodlight on this defect but did not eliminate it. The system of giving either an admiral or a general command over all forces in an area, according to whether naval or military interests are predominant, has worked some improvement. Nevertheless, the red tape incident to securing army aid for the navy resulted in unnecessary ship sinkings along the Atlantic coast, and the reluctance of the navy to have an army air base nearby accounted for the early heavy losses at Dutch Harbor, where the navy had nothing better than Catalina patrol planes to match Japanese fighters and dive bombers.

Nor has joint command been achieved in the international military sphere. Even announced agreements between the British and ourselves, where machinery for cooperative action has been in existence for several months, have not been carried out. The failure of the Anglo-American group to reach an understanding with the Russians is notorious. Finally, Mr. Roosevelt's attack on the demand of civilians and newspapers for a second front leaves room for a crushing reply. Civilian critics can always be accused of incomplete knowledge; a major fault of the present Administration has been its sugarcoating of news, its refusal to let the American people know the full facts. But even without all the facts, civilians have been right in their disputes with professional military men an amazingly large number of times.

In the First World War Winston Churchill, a civilian, brought about the introduction of tanks; had it been well used on a sufficient scale, the new weapon would have ended the war. He also promoted the adoption of convoys, a device which cheated the U-boat of victory. In both cases he faced the determined opposition of the generals and admirals of his day. In the present war he has silenced critics and remained almost completely in the camp of the professionals—and has been consistently defeated. It took Hitler, a rank amateur, to reveal the full incapacity and lack of imagination of the French generals commanding "the best army in the world." The recent development of torpedo planes is largely due to

the efforts of ex-Secretary of the Navy Edison, and was achieved over the opposition of Admiral Leahy, who usually had the support of the President. Congress in 1938 urged that large numbers of experimental patrol vessels be built for anti-submarine work. Had this line of development been followed with any enthusiasm by

the navy, the tremendous merchant-ship sinkings in the western Atlantic—sinkings which may yet cost us the war—would certainly have been checked much sooner. No sane person would disdain the technical advice of admirals and generals, but in the words of Clemenceau, "War is too important to be left solely to the generals."

Mexico's Home Front

BY HARRY BLOCK

Mexico City, October 10

MEXICO'S readjustment to the inexorable fact of war is beginning to make progress, though there is still more rhetoric than reality in the national mobilization. On Independence Day three weeks ago six ex-Presidents stood up with President Avila Camacho in an unprecedented ceremony of national unity. The vast crowd massed in the capital's central square had eyes, however, for only two of them—General Plutarco Elías Calles, former "Supreme Chief of the Mexican Revolution," and General Lázaro Cárdenas, who in 1936 exiled him from the country. It was a dramatic moment. No other figures so perfectly typify the dual tendencies and aims that have made the revolutionary development a social seesaw. Their first public appearance together in nearly eight years was presented as a visible symbol that past political differences were buried and that the nation was determined to exhibit an unbroken front to the world.

National unity has been the goal of the Camacho government since it came to power nearly two years ago, but the fact that it was thought necessary to put on so elaborate a spectacle suggests that unity is still not fully achieved. This impression is confirmed by the reception accorded the newsreels of the event in the movie houses, where the alternating applause and hisses for the six ex-Presidents indicated that Mexico's internal struggles have not yet been suspended for the duration. Nevertheless, no one can compare the general temper of the Mexican people today with the prevailing sentiment only six months ago without recognizing a marked change. The country is beginning to take the war seriously. Organization for defense and for war is moving ahead. A practice blackout in the capital was a remarkable demonstration of civil discipline. The new arms acquired from the United States made a brave display in the Independence Day parade, even if the army had to borrow some chauffeurs from the labor organizations to help drive the still unfamiliar motorized equipment. Compulsory military service has been enacted in Mexico, though the law is not yet in operation. Meanwhile,

throughout the country, hundreds of thousands of men of all ages are voluntarily drilling; the significant feature of this movement is that it began in the provinces and only recently reached Mexico City, an encouraging reversal of the usual process.

In spite of these healthy signs, however, it cannot be said that the battle of the home front has been won. Mexico during the preceding regime was largely engaged in refighting the Mexican Revolution, and it is utopian to suppose that its deep-seated antagonisms can be forgotten overnight or banished any farther than just below the surface. For the sake of unity, in order to appease business and industry, the labor movement has adopted what is virtually a no-strike policy. To appease landholders and the so-called "small proprietors" (corresponding to the commercial farmers who support the American farm lobby), the agrarian reform has been slowed and watered down. To appease the church, the educational system has been again revamped to purge it of its "socialist" character and its immoral practice of letting little boys and girls attend primary school together. Apparently unity has required the surrender to the conservatives of the chief positions captured during the preceding six years of renewed revolutionary upsurge. The lion and the lamb are indeed lying down together, but as usual the lamb is inside the lion.

Defense of democracy against totalitarianism, if it implies no more than a defense of the status quo, is an inadequate slogan even in the United States and Great Britain. To hold it up as an inspiration to the Mexican masses, who have never known genuine democracy, is of the nature of a cruel jest. One cannot ask people to "unite" without reference to the forces that have hitherto held them apart. What has been lacking here, clearly, is a progressive program that by giving concrete meaning to the concept of unity would arouse the national will in support of the war. It is no secret that Mexico's entry into the war found the majority of the population apathetic about its outcome and a small minority actively pro-Axis. The country's present political struggle centers on the question of what goals unity is expected to

achieve and who will write the program—the progressives, who sincerely seek to make Mexico's weight felt in the anti-fascist struggle and to combat the internal trends toward fascism, or the conservatives, who, finding themselves involved in a war they never wanted, would now like to have it fought for their exclusive benefit.

The first important sign of government recognition that the base of support for the war effort would have to be broadened came with the appointment of Cárdenas, shortly after Pearl Harbor, to command the Pacific defense zone. Ever since his retirement from the Presidency in 1940 Cárdenas has been a kind of symbol. Whether or not the man himself corresponded with the idea of him that took hold of the popular imagination is beside the point. For the man in the street, for the workers and peasants throughout the country, Cárdenas represented the hope of freedom, progress, and well-being; with the spread of disillusionment that accompanied the hard times ushered in by the war—long before Mexico was involved—the symbol of Cárdenas began to acquire almost magical power.

Cárdenas himself has remained correctly aloof, careful to dissociate himself from this growing sentiment and to give it no encouragement. When he stepped down from the Presidency he announced his intention of retiring to private life, and while this statement is made by all outgoing Mexican Presidents—and in the past has almost never been honored—there is reason to believe that Cárdenas meant it. Not only did he fail to assume leadership of the "opposition"—there was none, properly speaking, only an amorphous mass of puzzled discontent—but he publicly declared his unreserved support of the President.

This should have been enough to dampen the spirits of his more ardent followers. But it must again be insisted that it was less Cárdenas the man they were following than the idea associated with his name—the whole complex of policies, programs, acts, and objectives that his regime stood for. His appointment to the Pacific post was obviously a concession to this popular feeling, an effort on the part of the administration to capitalize his prestige. The political, rather than military, nature of the appointment was emphasized when General Abelardo Rodríguez, another ex-President, who represents almost the antithesis of Cárdenas, was named to the corresponding post on the Gulf Coast.

Early last month Cárdenas was appointed to a re-organized and enlarged Defense Ministry which is to assume supreme command over the army, the navy, and the air force. The left groups—labor organizations, the peasants, and the radical wing of the official Party of the Mexican Revolution—were jubilant, more so perhaps than the facts warrant, since Cárdenas, even if he were so disposed, which is doubtful, could not assume

leadership of the progressive movement unless he were provided with a clear and workable program of action, and this the left has so far failed to produce. The conservatives made little effort to conceal their distaste for the appointment, but tempered their criticism with the comment that Cárdenas would not be too disastrous a choice if he would refrain from "politics." As the shake-up was purely political in character, this attitude is almost comical. Whatever Cárdenas may or may not do, it had proved impossible to make real progress toward national unity without concession to the forces represented by the Cárdenas "idea."

Why did Cárdenas accept? If his enemies are right and he really harbors secret political ambitions, his position was obviously stronger outside the government than as a member of it. It is therefore being suggested here that very heavy pressure was brought to bear to induce him to accept; that the President came to the conclusion that the Cárdenas idea was potentially too explosive to leave floating about uncontrolled and that the way to diminish the importance of the symbol was to bring the man into Mexico City, where he would no longer be the subject of irresponsible speculation that was feeding unrest. If this theory is correct, it was a smart move. As a member of the government Cárdenas will share responsibility for its policies; and even if he finds himself in disagreement with them he can hardly withdraw. One can imagine the row the press would raise were the hated Cárdenas to "abandon his post in time of war" because of political differences with the regime. There is, on the other hand, no reason for supposing that Cárdenas did not accept the post because he felt he could thus best serve his country in the emergency. Some further Cabinet changes may be made as a result of his return to the government. There are indications that Véjar Vázquez, the intrepid hero of the war against coeducational elementary schools, may be on the way out. But no major shift in internal government policies appears imminent.

Among the chief obstacles to national unity are the rapid deterioration of the living standards of the Mexican masses in the past three years and the glaring fact that the country's privileged classes are making no com-



Lázaro Cárdenas

parable sacrifices for the war effort. In 1941 it already cost twice as much to eat as it did in 1933; today's prices have risen nearly 20 per cent over those of last year. Wages and salaries in the meantime have been stationary. If Mexico's rural population were dependent on the market rather than on their tiny subsistence patches—if Mexico, that is, were a developed capitalist country instead of a nation barely emerging from semi-feudalism—economic disaster would already have overtaken the nation; economic backwardness has certain negative virtues of its own. But if the peasants' state of permanent depression has not been seriously affected by the situation, the city dwellers, especially the industrial workers and the minor employees of government and private business, have been taking a severe beating. What would Mr. Henderson do with a rise in food prices—which make up three-quarters of the living expenses of the average Mexican family—of more than 100 per cent?

An additional point that cannot be too strongly emphasized is that Mexico is now almost 100 per cent dependent on the United States. Practically nothing enters the country except from the United States; nothing leaves it except to the United States. Such dependence is pernicious economically; it is even worse politically. For the century that Mexicans have been struggling to win national independence they have been taught to fear and suspect the big neighbor to the north. Their present dependence on Washington for their very bread is for that reason all the more galling.

We are paying now for past sins just as surely as the British are paying for their past sins in India. India is a case in point. The present Indian crisis, because it provides the first great test of the validity of the Atlantic Charter's high-sounding principles, is being closely watched throughout Latin America. As countries with only the shadow, seldom the substance, of national independence, the American republics are vitally interested in the charter; only unequivocal action to implement its promises will change their somewhat cynical view of the brave new world it is supposed to usher in. In the meantime they observe the realities of British rule in India—and wonder. What prospect does an Allied victory hold out to them?

Will Mexico, for example, be less dependent on the United States after the war? Many Mexicans honestly fear being doomed to a permanent economic subservience that will effectively short-circuit all the nation's hopes of true independence. They see the future as a blind alley of frustrated nationalism in which it will be impossible to turn back—the Mexican Revolution has at least accomplished that much—and equally impossible to forge ahead. This is what those Mexicans are thinking about who observe pessimistically that in the long run their country may have almost as much to fear from the United States as from Germany.

Now this is a highly dangerous attitude. It is no longer possible to draw nice subjective distinctions between "innocent" anti-Americanism and actual pro-Hitlerism. Only too often patriotic nationalist opinions, however honestly held, provide a convenient opening for Axis propaganda, whose ends are adequately gained if it can succeed in inflaming the latent anti-gringo sentiment. But the way to combat this tendency is by removing the grievances that lend it apparent justification. Some months ago Vice-President Wallace declared that American imperialism was dead. Sumner Welles has several times reinforced the statement. Theirs were excellent words. But unfortunately, as the war continues, the internal economy of Mexico becomes ever more adversely affected by the economic necessities of the United States; though the death of imperialism has been proclaimed, the imperialist character of the economic relations between the United States and Latin America has actually been strengthened. Probably very little can be done under war conditions materially to correct this situation, but a program for the future conceived in terms more precise than those of the Atlantic Charter would go far toward allaying existing fears. The time to draft such a program is now. If we expect to defeat Axis imperialism, we must persuade people that we are not hoping to maintain an imperialist preserve in our own backyard.

Mexico's reactionaries have their own solution ready. It is a solution that leaves 90 per cent of the Mexican people out of the picture, but it has the virtue of solving the problem quite satisfactorily for the other 10 per cent. Let Mexico continue to be dependent on American industry. Let foreign capital come in on its own terms to exploit native resources. Offer "guaranties"—protection against taxation, against labor and agrarian demands. And let Mexico continue to be an exporter of raw materials produced by the 90 per cent and an importer of finished goods to be consumed by the 10 per cent. With enough funds allocated from the surplus of this system to police the country, it can even be made to work—for a time, for *their* time, anyway.

Is there another solution? The answer to that is another question: Is this an anti-fascist war? Are we not fighting to render impossible the reactionary solution of the social problem of our time? The common people of all countries have the same goal in the conflict—the destruction not only of fascism in Germany and Italy and Japan but of its seeds and tendencies within their own borders. If unity ceases to be an abstract slogan and becomes the purposeful unity of all anti-fascist forces, if the hidden civil war that underlies the international war is courageously recognized and loyally fought, then there is real hope for the future. The democratic peoples of America will find a way to an inter-American economy that will satisfy the needs and the aspirations of all.

Lewis and the A. F. of L.

BY JAMES A. WECHSLER

Toronto, October 15

NOTHING that happened at the American Federation of Labor's sixty-second convention created as much animated discussion among the A. F. of L. delegates as the latest antics of the man who wasn't there—John L. Lewis. A. F. of L. officials read dispatches from the Cincinnati convention of the Mine Workers more avidly than stories about their own deliberations. They speculated on the possibility that Lewis might appear in Toronto before the A. F. of L. sessions ended. At least four delegates solemnly announced they had seen Philip Murray scurrying through the hotel lobby, racing to get in ahead of his ex-boss.

Lewis's formal withdrawal from the C. I. O. evoked a mixed response from A. F. of L. leaders. Nearly all of them, of course, derive great pleasure from the troubles of what Federation orators still call the "rebel, rival dual movement." Moreover, they feel that the break between Lewis and the C. I. O. enormously enhances A. F. of L. bargaining power in the coming unity negotiations. They are convinced that the C. I. O. leadership will hasten to make peace before Lewis can get back into the A. F. of L. on his own. They enjoy the prospect of Lewis and Murray competing for A. F. of L. favor. William Green took pains to point out that the "door is open" to the United Mine Workers and that a separate peace with Lewis is not out of the question.

While all this is regarded as fitting punishment for "those who left the house of labor," there is a substantial A. F. of L. bloc that would genuinely prefer to deal with the C. I. O.; it recognizes that Lewis's return to the A. F. of L. would virtually doom unity negotiations and does not relish the thought of "Big John" again bossing Federation affairs. Green privately subscribes to this view. But the proceedings of the Toronto convention did nothing to dispel the impression that William L. Hutcheson, czar of the building trades and John L.'s Republican playmate, exerts more influence in the A. F. of L.'s back room than Green or those who think like Green. It is generally believed that Hutcheson will continue to do private business with Lewis. He is a member of the A. F. of L. three-man committee that will soon meet with the C. I. O. Lewis will not be uninformed of what goes on.

It is possible that Franklin D. Roosevelt may have to step in once again to prevent a deal that would put the C. I. O.'s leaders on the spot and restore Lewis's power. Lewis's Cincinnati rhetoric was an admission, it is felt,

that he has to reckon with the President; his complaint that the C. I. O. chiefs were trying to "undermine" him at the White House was an acknowledgment that he respects Roosevelt's influence in labor affairs. There were even some who detected a note of deference. But it is considered doubtful that Mr. Roosevelt will be moved. One high A. F. of L. official with no special animus against Lewis said to me here, "We all know John still hopes to take the labor movement back to the Republican Party." (He didn't mean the Willkie wing.) Until Lewis abandons that hope, he will have to fight Roosevelt as well as Philip Murray to recapture control of United States labor. Hutcheson's influence is not to be minimized, but few A. F. of L. chiefs seem ready to quarrel with the White House.

Apart from the extra-curricular diversion created by Lewis, the A. F. of L.'s ten-day conference shattered no traditions. Perhaps the most significant trend revealed by the meetings was the widening gap between British labor and A. F. of L. leaders over relations with the Russian trade unionists. The two fraternal delegates from the British Trades Union Congress—Jack Tanner and Bryn Roberts—pleaded politely but vigorously for reversal of the Federation's refusal to sit on a joint committee with the Russian trade unionists—without result. Tanner was received in frigid silence, largely because he tried to sell a party-line analysis of the Soviet state as well as the war need for an international labor front. Roberts, who stuck to the latter point, got a better reaction, but it was less than enthusiastic. After a brief debate in which Matthew Woll laid down the A. F. of L.'s line, the convention voted overwhelmingly to reaffirm the Federation's past position—aid to the Soviet armies but no direct dealings with Soviet labor. The left-wing forces at this convention could have held their caucus in the proverbial telephone booth.

The most dramatic incident was again precipitated by A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and one of the two Negro delegates on the scene. Randolph made his annual plea for appointment of a committee to combat discrimination in A. F. of L. unions. He also urged the convention to speak out in behalf of independence for India. No white delegate in the crowd of 600 rose to support him on either count. Dan Tobin of the Teamsters assailed Randolph for "lighting the torch of dissension." The convention voted to deplore race discrimination and to refer the fate of India to the Anglo-American labor com-

mittee. It is generally acknowledged that Green would have liked to do something about the Negro issue, but his longing for harmony overcame his better instincts.

The A. F. of L.'s attitude toward the Russian trade unions and toward union discrimination will plague the negotiators when the meetings with the C. I. O. begin. Yet more important than these ideological conflicts is the survival of deep and bitter resentment; this convention gave no new sign that reconciliation is in the air. The Federation formally proposed an immediate armistice on "raiding," but no machinery to enforce the truce was suggested. Speakers who inveighed against the C. I. O.'s past got the biggest ovations. The present members of the Labor Relations Board were denounced as fiercely as their predecessors for allegedly favoring the C. I. O.

The boys also whooped things up over the behavior of Thurman Arnold; there was a minor degree of pandemonium when news was received that Arnold's move for a temporary injunction against James C. Petrillo had been thrown out of court. Perhaps the most intense discussion of the convention, however, concerned a jurisdictional dispute between the Carpenters and Machinists, a struggle which goes back to 1914. A similar dispute between the Machinists and the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees was also gone over at length. These ancient matters filled several long hours of convention time. The Machinists lost twice, if anybody cares.

Poll Tax and Filibuster

BY J. LACEY REYNOLDS

BY A thumping three-to-one majority the House has passed the Geyer bill prohibiting poll taxes in Congressional and other federal elections. Never before have there been such bright prospects for emancipating the federal electorate in the eight Southern poll-tax states. But there are formidable obstacles to be overcome in the Senate, despite the fact that a majority would speedily pass the Geyer bill's Senate counterpart, the Pepper bill, if given the chance. The Senate Judiciary Committee, which has dawdled with the Pepper bill for nineteen months, will probably have taken action by the time this article appears, but even assuming the discharge, the bill faces the serious threat of a filibuster by a stubborn band of reactionary Southerners. This small minority need hold out only to the end of the present session in January, when all bills die.

The Senate greased the constitutional ways for passage of the Geyer-Pepper bill when it voted thirty-three to twenty, last August, to abolish the poll tax for soldiers. At that time the question whether Congress has constitutional authority to legislate on poll taxes was thoroughly debated. In the matter of legality the Geyer-

Pepper bill does not differ from the soldier-vote act, and therefore the Senate cannot very well adduce constitutional objections. To do so would convict it of having made a purely political play for soldier support.

The Senate Judiciary Committee's handling of the Pepper bill is worth recounting. A five-man subcommittee headed by Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Wyoming Democrat, has held intermittent hearings on it for fifteen months. On October 2 this group brought in an unfavorable report, with only Senator George Norris, the Nebraska liberal, voting affirmatively. O'Mahoney wrote the majority report, which criticized the bill with a savagery that warmed the heart of his colleague on the subcommittee, Senator Tom Connally of poll-taxed Texas. Congress, O'Mahoney said, has no authority to abolish the poll tax by simple statute, a constitutional amendment is necessary; the Constitution gives the states sole authority to fix qualifications for federal voters, and besides, this is not the time to pass such legislation. As an interpretation of the Constitution according to Connally, the job could not have been better done by the Texan himself. O'Mahoney has introduced a constitutional amendment, but nobody takes it seriously. Only the Southerners rose to commend it for the obvious purpose of diverting strength from the Geyer-Pepper bill.

The full committee postponed action on the subcommittee report, presumably to see how the House voted on the Geyer bill. The 252-to-84 House verdict ought to prove sufficient to force out a report, but even if it does not, all hope is not lost. Senator Norris has promised to submit the motion to discharge the committee, if necessary. The quicker the issue is brought to debate the easier it will be to ride out a filibuster.

The Pepper-Geyer bill is in essence a war measure. It will remove the mote from our own eyes and demonstrate to the world that we believe in the democracy which we recommend to others. It will deprive the Axis of the powerful propaganda argument that we do not practice what we preach. It will give the low-income Southerner the opportunity to help choose officials of the government which has sent his sons to battle and demanded many other sacrifices of him.

The arguments of the bill's opponents are depressingly traditional. On the final day of the hearings of the O'Mahoney subcommittee, Governor Frank Dixon of Alabama and Richard M. Jeffries of South Carolina offered the same objections to poll-tax repeal that were formerly raised against the Wage-Hour Act and other federal regulatory laws. Listening to these gentlemen expound states' rights, one had the impression that on their record of their country's history the needle had stuck at the Webster-Hayne debate. Outside the committee-room window an American soldier paced back and forth, a symbol of democracy on guard, while within they debated whether democracy was worth extending.

Gandhi to Chiang Kai-shek

[Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is the best authority in the world on who is pro-Japanese and who is anti-Japanese. Chiang believes that Mahatma Gandhi is anti-Japanese. Chiang is certain that British concessions now to the Indian Nationalist movement would help China and help win this war. The Chinese government has made vigorous representations to Great Britain with a view to a settlement of the Indian question. Chiang is pro-Gandhi because he knows Gandhi is pro-Chinese. While in India this summer I obtained from a Chinese source the following hitherto unpublished letter to Chiang written by Gandhi before he launched the present civil-disobedience movement.—LOUIS FISCHER.]

I CAN never forget the five hours' close contact I had with you and your noble wife in Calcutta. I always felt drawn toward you in your fight for freedom, and that contact and our conversation brought China and her problems still nearer to me. Long ago, between 1905 and 1913, when I was in South Africa, I was in constant touch with the small Chinese colony in Johannesburg. I knew them first as clients and then as comrades in the Indian passive-resistance struggle in South Africa. I came into touch with them in Mauritius also. I learned then to admire their thrift, industry, resourcefulness, and internal unity. Later in India I had a very fine Chinese friend living with me for a few years, and we all learned to like him. I have thus felt greatly attracted toward your great country, and, in common with my countrymen, my sympathy has gone out to you in your terrible struggle. Our mutual friend, Jawaharlal Nehru, whose love of China is only excelled, if at all, by his love of his own country, has kept us in intimate touch with the developments of the Chinese struggle.

Because of this feeling I have toward China and my earnest desire that our two great countries should come closer to each other and cooperate to their mutual advantage, I am anxious to explain to you that my appeal to the British power to withdraw from India is not meant in any shape or form to weaken India's defense against the Japanese or embarrass you in your struggle. India must not submit to any aggressor or invader and must resist him. I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your country's freedom. That problem does not arise before me, since I am clear that India cannot gain her freedom in this way, and a Japanese domination of either India or China would be equally injurious to the other country and to world peace. That domination must therefore be pre-

vented, and I should like India to play her natural and rightful part in this. I feel India cannot do so while she is in bondage. India has been a helpless witness of the withdrawals from Malaya, Singapore, and Burma. We must learn the lesson from these tragic events and prevent by all means at our disposal a repetition of what befell these unfortunate countries. But unless we are free we can do nothing to prevent it, and the same process might well occur again, crippling India and China disastrously. I do not want a repetition of this tragic tale of woe.

Our proffered help has repeatedly been rejected by the British government, and the recent failure of the Cripps mission has left a deep wound, which is still running. Out of that anguish has come the cry for immediate withdrawal of British power so that India can look after herself and help China to the best of her ability. I have told you of my faith in non-violence and of my belief in the effectiveness of this method if the whole nation could turn to it. The faith in it is as firm as ever. But I realize that India today as a whole has not that faith and belief, and the government in Free India would be formed from the various elements composing the nation.

Today the whole of India is impotent and feels frustrated. The Indian army consists largely of people who have joined up because of economic pressure. They have no feeling of a cause to fight for, and in no sense are they a national army. Those of us who would fight for a cause, for India and China, with armed forces or with non-violence, cannot under the foreign heel function as we want to. And yet our people know for certain that India free can play even a decisive part, not only in her own behalf, but also in behalf of China and world peace. Many, like me, feel that it is not proper or manly to remain in this helpless state and allow events to overwhelm us when a way to effective action can be opened to us. They feel, therefore, that every possible effort should be made to insure independence and that freedom of action which is so urgently needed. This is the origin of my appeal to the British power to end immediately the unnatural connection between Britain and India.

Unless we make that effort there is grave danger of public feeling in India going into wrong and harmful channels. There is every likelihood of subterranean sympathy for Japan growing, simply in order to weaken and oust British authority in India. This feeling may take the place of robust confidence in our ability never to

Time

Time means quite a different thing to a man who is trying to hold the Nazis on the Volga than it does to an Allied officer preparing material for the next meeting of the General Staff. Time is counted differently in a French concentration camp where an anti-fascist fighter awaits the reply to his last desperate appeal for a visa than in the foreign office where bored officials consider whether the applicant is or is not likely to dynamite the foundations of the state. Time may be only one hour—between six and seven, neither too bright nor too dark—for the young Parisian who waits for the Nazi sergeant to shoot him down. It may be six months or a year for those charged with the creation of a Supreme Allied Council to direct political war.

"Time is on our side" sounded all right when the smashing successes of the Nazi armies held the nations in fearful suspense and it was necessary to present time as an ally. Today those words suggest anything but a will to win. To the soldiers in the trenches they are an exasperation; to the peoples of the occupied countries, a cruel agony. To the appeasers they offer the hope that the invasion of Europe may be delayed until time has once more moved to the "other side," and a negotiated peace has become possible.

look to outsiders for help in winning our freedom. We have to learn self-reliance and develop the strength to work out our own salvation. This is only possible if we make a determined effort to free ourselves from bondage. That freedom has become a present necessity to enable us to take our due place among the free nations of the world.

To make it perfectly clear that we want to prevent in every way Japanese aggression, I would personally agree, and I am sure the government of Free India would agree, that the Allied powers might, under treaty with us, keep their armed forces in India and use the country as a base for operations against the threatened Japanese attack.

I need hardly give you my assurance that, as the author of the new move in India, I shall take no hasty action. And whatever action I may recommend will be governed by the consideration that it should not injure China or encourage Japanese aggression in India or China. I am trying to enlist world opinion in favor of a proposition which to me appears self-proved and which must lead to the strengthening of India's and China's defense. I am also educating public opinion in India and conferring with my colleagues. Needless to say, any movement

against the British government with which I may be connected will be essentially non-violent. I am straining every nerve to avoid a conflict with British authority. But if in the winning of freedom, which has become an immediate desideratum, this becomes inevitable, I shall not hesitate to run any risk however great.

Very soon you will have completed five years of war against Japanese aggression and invasion and all the sorrow and misery that these have brought to China. My heart goes out to the people of China in deep sympathy and admiration for their heroic struggle and endless sacrifices against tremendous odds. I am convinced that this heroism and sacrifice cannot be in vain; they must bear fruit. To you, to Madame, and to the great people of China I send my earnest and sincere wishes for your success. I look forward to the day when a free India and a free China will cooperate together in friendship and brotherhood for their own good and for the good of Asia and the world.

MOHANDAS K. GANDHI

EDITOR'S NOTE

Surely it is the desire of every lover of freedom to see the Indian question settled in accordance with the principles that should inspire a great struggle for democracy, and in a way that will strengthen, rather than weaken, the war effort of the United Nations. The one important point to keep in mind is this: neither Great Britain nor the Indian Congress is the enemy. The enemy is Hitler, it is fascism; and the primary aim is still to win the war. The Indian Congress leaders could not even be approached had their antagonism to the British led them into the mad delusion that India could expect freedom from Nazi Germany or Fascist Japan. If, on the other hand, a basis of agreement on the Indian question can be found in Bertrand Russell's very practical suggestion of a joint commission of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China, the first step in that direction would be to clear the air of any misunderstanding in regard to Gandhi's attitude toward Japan. To this end we consider the foregoing document of great importance.

J. A. del V.

Pressure on Scandinavia

BY GUNNAR LEISTIKOW

THE recent happenings in Scandinavia may or may not be Germany's first move toward annexation—the union of Germanic nations advertised by Goebbels—but undoubtedly the northern countries are in for a harsh change of status. The intensification of the terror in Norway is an ominous sign. The breaking off of diplomatic relations with Denmark on October 6 appears to be a curtain-raiser to a performance not yet announced. Sweden, ever more openly defying German

overlordship, feels the pressure that would force it into the pattern of the "New Europe."

Of Danish liberty not much is left. The German promise of April 9, 1940, to refrain from interference in Danish internal affairs was broken after a few months. The Danes were forced from the start to accept Nazi censorship of the press and of all communications. In October, 1940, the Germans interfered for the first time with the Danish administration, banning former Minister of Trade Christmas Moller from the Foreign Relations Committee. At that time they used the two main threats they have held over the Danes ever since—suspension of coal imports, on which the whole country is dependent, and establishment of a Gestapo regime. On November 17, 1940, they staged a mass demonstration in Copenhagen, and their Quisling, Frits Clausen, boasted that the time had come to take power. However, the German military command, watching from the balconies of Dagmarhus, saw the Danish masses turn this Nazi celebration into an imposing demonstration against Nazism. The Danish authorities have had to answer the increasing sabotage with heavier and heavier punishments, and prisons are so crowded that convicted persons have to wait months to serve their terms.


Meanwhile the Germans are ruining the country with a technique of their own. They buy Danish agricultural products at ever higher prices, but they pay—in coal or other materials—only a small part of the prices they set. For the rest they compel the Danes to give them credit, to be paid "after the victory." In July of this year their indebtedness was more than two billion kroner, as much as the entire working capital of the country. That Denmark's whole economy is going to pieces does not worry the Germans. The crisis in Danish industry and agriculture produces hundreds of thousands of unemployed—potential workers if not soldiers for Germany—and man-power is what the Germans most need. However, the Danish unemployed have not been eager to work for the enemy; of the 77,000 Danes who have at different times worked in Germany, only 42,000 were left in May of this year. Although they could expect neither work nor dole on their return, the rest struggled back from the Nazi paradise. Unquestionably, the obstacles encountered in recruiting Danish man-power were a main cause of the surprising suspen-

sion of diplomatic relations between Nazi Germany and one of its satellites.

The German demands may also have included a declaration of war against Russia or adherence to a Germanic union under Hitler's leadership—tantamount of course to surrender of Danish sovereignty. As early as the summer of 1940 the Germans invited the Danes to enter a *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* with the Third Reich, that is, a customs and currency union, and even, practically, common citizenship. The Nazis dropped the plan when the Danes said no thank you, but they may now dig it up again.

A Germanic union, however, would be a joke without Sweden, and proclamation of such a union would make the Swedes more obstinate than ever. That is why such a league, even if it is now considered, will probably be pigeonholed. But it is also the reason why the Swedes feel so jittery over Goebbels's campaign.

As far back as 1934 Hitler told Rauschning that in the next war he would have to occupy Sweden; he could not leave it to either British or Russian influence. He even said that he would form a northern union of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, not as an alliance of equals, but as an "alliance of vassal states with no army, no separate policy, and no separate economy." In April, 1940, he realized a part of this program. If at that time he confined his operations to Denmark and Norway, one of his main reasons was undoubtedly that the Swedes no longer were "nowhere prepared to put up a sufficiently strong defense," as it had looked to him eight years before, but on the contrary were able to make an undertaking against Sweden a costly affair. This is true



THE NORDIC RACE

Drawing by Bendix.

now even more than in 1940, for the Swedes have forged their armed forces into a first-class fighting unit, and the utterances of their leaders leave no doubt that they will use it if a showdown is forced on them.

The feverish preparations of the Germans in Norway and their persecution of the inhabitants show their nervousness about a possible second front there. For Norway with its limited communications cannot be defended against a strong invader without the use of the Swedish roads. So the Germans have today an added interest in carrying out Hitler's original plans.

Signs are increasing that the Swedes are in for serious trouble. Recently a high German police officer was arrested while photographing the naval base in Stockholm from his hotel window. The reported subdivision of the Nordic race into *Herrenvolk* and *Untergermanen* indicates strongly a projected reorganization of the whole northern *Raum*. And, last but not least, the German radio has intensified its anti-Swedish campaign to a definitely menacing extent. It proclaimed some days ago that "the Bolshevik agents in Sweden" were only waiting for "the favorable moment to assume power by an armed uprising" and that the Swedish army presumably would "fall into Communist hands like ripe fruit." Usually Goebbels takes this tone only when the Nazis just are about to "liberate" a nation.

Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

FROM Göring's speech of October 4 little more was published than the avowal that Europe's food supplies would be used to satisfy the needs of "Germany first" and those of other peoples afterward. It was something new to hear this principle announced so openly, but the principle itself was not new. In fact, Göring made several much more surprising statements.

Up to now we have known almost nothing about the amount of food available for the German people. We knew the normal "food balance" of the Reich and the conquered regions, but we had no idea of the extent to which the war had decreased agricultural production. Nor, on the other hand, had we any idea how well the Nazi machine had been able to exploit the occupied countries. On these matters Göring's speech threw considerable light. It revealed that farm production within Germany and also the loot taken from the conquered territories have shown a marked downward trend. In the spring of 1942 this downward trend became so steep that the government for the first time feared that "we should not make connections with the next harvest." "The situation was extremely serious." Göring insisted that from now on things would be better, but he offered no convincing reasons for expecting this change.

The 1940 harvest was "in no way fortunate." It was

a "poor harvest." Then in 1940-41 France, Holland, and Denmark—all important agricultural countries—were conquered. In them the Germans found large stocks and standing crops. To these supplies was added the harvest in Poland, where the Germans had been organizing production for a year. One might think that so many new sources would provide enough to cover Germany's own deficit. No, said Göring, it was not enough. In addition, part of the German war reserves had to be used. Only by drawing on these stores could the German people be properly nourished.

The harvest of 1941 was again a "poor" one. But in 1941-42 there were more conquests, Yugoslavia was overrun, and the hold on Bulgaria and Rumania was tightened. In Russia a vast grain-producing region stretching from the Baltic to the Ukraine fell before German might—and let no one think that everything there was destroyed. But in spite of these conquests, it was again necessary to throw Germany's war reserves into the breach—its last reserves. Now, Göring said plainly, the reserves were used up. They had been enough to carry the country through to the harvest, but only with the help of a drastic reduction of food rations in April.

We can draw but one conclusion: however wide the areas that have been opened to exploitation, each year of the war has reduced the amount of foodstuffs in German barns and silos. Göring tried to lay the blame for this development on the caprices of the weather. He spoke of the "three iron winters that we have suffered." But to claim bad luck three times running is a little too much. As a matter of fact, the continuous downward trend indicates a continuous force behind it. And it is hard to be impressed by Göring's prediction of an upward turn in the near future when he bases it entirely on the latest conquests in Russia. Granted that "fields miles wide" have been acquired along the Don, the essence of his own demonstration is that all the land won by Germany has only decreased the supply of food.

Spain Says No

ALTOGETHER they numbered about 26,000, the Spanish in the four concentration camps in southern France lately visited by a German delegation. The Nazi spokesman was all flattery and promises. "They might have been called reds, they might be reds, but as fighters they were first class—the Wehrmacht recognized that during the Spanish war." Now Germany invited them to come to work. They would be well fed (in the concentration camps many Spanish refugees have died of hunger); they would receive excellent wages, a good part of which they might send to their families in Spain or in Mexico; and if at any time they wanted to go back to Spain, the German government would see that they were not persecuted and were reestablished in their civil rights.

And how many of the 26,000 consented to work in the German industries? Exactly 73.

Keep Them Out!

VIII. REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON FISH

BY WILLIAM JORDY AND WILL CHASAN

NEW YORK'S Twenty-sixth Congressional District will be a political testing ground this November. Should it return Hamilton Fish to Congress, it will have demonstrated that a man may associate openly with fascists, with all that this implies, and still retain the allegiance of his constituents.

Fish, it is true, is doing his diligent best to divert attention from his discrediting associations and activities as a leader of the extreme isolationist bloc. A shrewd politician, he is not attempting to meet the criticism of his record. Instead he is attacking the critics. They are "malicious" people, he says, who are resurrecting old quarrels and creating disunity. They represent an "unholy alliance of left-wing New Dealers, Communists, and rabid millionaire interventionists" which is more concerned with winning elections than with winning the war. Against his Democratic opponent, Judge Ferdinand Hoyt, Fish has brought the weighty accusation that he employs a ghost writer. It is trivial and irrelevant, but conveniently distracting.

However, with all this Fish has not succeeded in eliminating his record as the campaign's paramount issue. "His record is so bad," one local Democratic politician observed, "you can't forget it even by closing your eyes. The smell is too strong."

Hamilton Fish launched his career as an isolationist leader in February, 1938, when he condemned the \$800,000,000 naval-expansion bill as "unnecessary to defense." Subsequently he voted for several military appropriation bills, not "all," as he now is telling his constituents, but opposed the fortification of Guam, repeal of the arms embargo, lend-lease, the draft extension, and the abandonment of belligerent zones. He christened the Lend-Lease Act the "war, dictatorship, and bankruptcy bill," and denounced other measures as attempts by the "Moscow-Roosevelt-Bullitt axis" to involve us in a "Presidential war." His policy, he informed Congress, was to wait until war came here. He conceded that if Canada were attacked we should aid it, "but not if only a few bombs are dropped."

Fish's real offense, however, was not that he favored non-intervention, disastrously shortsighted though that policy has proved to be, but that he was blatantly pro-German. To a far greater degree than Chamberlain and the other apostles of appeasement, he indorsed the Nazi claim to *Lebensraum*.

This was made quite clear in the summer of 1939 when as minority leader of the House Foreign Affairs Committee he visited Europe to attend meetings of the Interparliamentary Union at Oslo. The trip was regarded in Congress as a harmless vacation junket at public expense. But Fish landed in France early in August and almost immediately went to see Nazi Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. His conferences with von Ribbentrop, or perhaps it was some prior influence, convinced him that the German claims to Danzig were "just" and that Danzig was "97 per cent Nazi." Two days later he went in von Ribbentrop's plane to Oslo, where he proposed a solution to the Danzig problem which would have been satisfactory to the Nazis. When other delegates attacked his proposal as smacking too much of Munich, Fish waved them aside. "I don't care about Munich," he said generously, "or if one group or another of the powers gains some small benefits from such an arrangement." The claim that we couldn't do business with Hitler he dismissed as "preposterous."

The march into Poland brought Fish home. Immediately he began to show the direction of his sympathies. Shortly after the Germans took Warsaw, they claimed to have discovered in the American embassy correspondence from Ambassador Bullitt which revealed a plot by the Administration to involve the United States in war. The correspondence was denounced here as fictitious, but Fish's response was to declare that he "could not conceive of the Germans forging documents," and to ask for Bullitt's recall and the President's impeachment. All his activities began to reflect this warm regard for Nazi Germany. He spoke at a Madison Square Garden rally at which the Horst Wessel song, the Nazi anthem, was sung and a huge Nazi flag displayed on the platform. He wrote an article for *Today's Challenge*, a magazine edited by Nazi propagandist Frederick Auhagen. He addressed a meeting of the Steuben Society inaugurating a drive for \$150,000 to combat British propaganda. In Congress he denounced "German-phobia" and insisted that it was "none of our business what form of government any nation has." He also came to the support of Germany's Axis partner, Japan. On Japan Day at the World's Fair he said, "The Japanese have proclaimed a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East. . . . We have adhered closely to our own Monroe Doctrine for 120 years, and feeling as strongly as we do about the West-



Hamilton Fish

ern Hemisphere, we cannot object to Japan holding the same views." Some of his fellow-Congressmen began to regret audibly that he had come home from Europe.

Most of Fish's isolationist activities were channeled through the National Committee to Keep America Out of War, of which he was the national chairman. Nazi agent George Sylvester Viereck, with whom Fish was friendly, is reported to have inspired its formation. The committee recently was denounced by the Department of Justice as a transmission belt for Nazi propaganda. George Hill, Fish's secretary, was indicted for sedition because he used the committee's mailing list for the dissemination of fascist propaganda. Fish was placed on the witness stand during the Hill trial. He disclaimed any knowledge of the purposes for which the committee had been used. "I wouldn't know Nazi propaganda if I saw it," was his implausible explanation to the court. "I don't know anything about it."

The motive for Fish's activities, which fall so unmistakably into a pro-German pattern, is quite clear. He never has made any effort to conceal his conviction, one which the Nazis have assiduously cultivated, that Germany is a bulwark against communism. He has always wanted Germany to march on Russia, and could not see "why Great Britain should oppose German expansion eastward." Two days before Pearl Harbor he said in the House, "I repeat, if we enter the war and finally destroy the German army, we can do only one thing, and that is to bring communism to Germany, Italy, Poland, France—all of Europe." In brief, in Fish's view, the Nazi armies have become the defenders of Western civilization.

In addition to publicizing Fish's unsavory pro-German

and obstructionist activities, his opponents in the Twenty-sixth Congressional District are wisely stressing the story of his dubious relations with General Rafael Trujillo. This story, which came to light last August, demonstrates almost as much as Fish's Nazi associations his unfitness for office. In 1937 Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, unleashed his horrifying "Haitian massacre." Fish termed the massacre a "most outrageous atrocity" and urged withdrawing recognition from the Dominican Republic. On January 24, 1938, he inserted in the *Congressional Record* Quentin Reynolds's account of the massacre, which had appeared in *Collier's*. A year went by. Then a series of strange incidents occurred. In February, 1939, Trujillo hired George Jamhar Djamgaroff, a shady international character now under investigation, to do promotion work for the Dominican Republic. Investigation has revealed that Fish wrote a letter of recommendation for Djamgaroff, though Fish denies this. Then, on March 20, 1939, Hamilton Fish visited the Dominican Republic as a guest of Trujillo to rededicate the Christopher Columbus monument. In 1939 Trujillo visited the United States, and on July 12 was guest of honor at a dinner sponsored by the Pan-American Society. Fish was among the principal speakers. Five days later \$25,000 was transferred from Trujillo's account to Fish's in a New York bank. Of this sum Fish invested \$8,000 in the Nepaug Oil Company at Houston, Texas. When Nepaug's wells ran dry, he returned \$12,000 to the Trujillo account. Did Fish get a fee for this? He says it was simply a mutual interest in hot oil and that he offered his services as a friend without compensation. The Treasury Department is still investigating his 1939 income tax. But consider—regardless of the investigation's result—the spectacle of the ranking minority member of the Foreign Affairs Committee mixed up in the hot-oil dealings of a Central American dictator!

His fascist entanglements and the Trujillo revelation definitely have Fish on the run. Although he won the Republican nomination over the opposition of Wendell Willkie and Tom Dewey, he has been disowned by important Republican elements. Augustus Bennett, his opponent in the Republican primary, is supporting Judge Hoyt. The Poughkeepsie *Eagle News*, which supported him for twenty-two years, now is opposing him. Fish, realizing that he is in a precarious position, is campaigning desperately. For the first time in his political career he has opened headquarters, at Newburgh, one of the district's few large communities. He has replaced his well-tailored blue serges for the old greenish suit which has seen him through eleven previous campaigns, and he is busier than ever making the rounds of the clambake circuit.

Like his friend Dies, Fish has assumed the role of a martyr hounded by New Deal radicals. His campaign is

strictly anti-New Deal, and in a district which sometimes seems less proud of the fact that President Roosevelt makes his home there than that he "can't even carry his own town of Hyde Park," this is a powerful line of attack.

But Fish is not relying on anti-New Deal prejudices alone. His principal asset is the personal following he has built up during twenty-two years as a Congressman. The Fish family is one of the oldest in the district, and its present representative, more than his Hyde Park constituent, is the district's political "country squire." He has replied to every communication addressed to him by his constituents, performed thousands of personal favors for them, and made them feel that he was their personal agent at Washington. It is this immense store of good-will, carefully accumulated over more than two decades, on which Fish now is counting.

At the present moment the outcome of the campaign is still in doubt. Two years ago a comparatively unknown candidate, Hardy Steeholm, running a small last-minute campaign, whittled Fish's usual 30,000 plurality down to 8,000. Steeholm could have come within 4,000 votes of Fish had he also won the 4,000 votes of the American Labor Party. This year Judge Hoyt, a popular "home-town boy" and a former editor of the *Beacon News*, has the nomination of both the Democratic and the American Labor Party. In addition, he will receive support, the extent of which is unpredictable, from anti-Fish Republicans, to whom he is shrewdly appealing by adopting a friendly but critical attitude toward the Administration. He is being backed actively by the Poughkeepsie Central Labor Union, the garment workers in Newburgh and Beacon, the railroad workers at Port Jervis, and other labor groups. Perhaps he will also have in his camp the parents of boys in the armed forces; the percentage of drafted boys, high for the district as a whole, is among the highest in the country in the section around Beacon and Wappinger Falls. Hoyt's campaign platform begins, "There is only one issue—to win the war and win the peace," and his speakers are concentrating on the line that "defeating Ham Fish is a war issue."

It is a campaign where feelings woven out of twenty-two years of habit, of patronage, of small favors, of political allegiance, are pitted against what can only be called fundamental democratic convictions. Fish's reelection would not, of course, prove that his constituents look with favor on fascism or fascists. But it would prove that a typical American community is prepared, in return for certain petty advantages, to tolerate an associate of fascists, if not something considerably worse, in much the same way that other communities for similar reasons have tolerated the associates of grafters and racketeers. It would be an unpleasant augury for American democracy.

In the Wind

IN THE SECTION in which it lists foreign diplomats in Washington, the "Congressional Directory" employs three footnote symbols to refer readers to additional information: "The asterisk," it says, "designates those whose wives accompany them; the dagger designates those whose unmarried daughters in society accompany them; the parallel lines designate those having other ladies with them."

MEMBERS OF A BRIDGE CLUB in Gallatin, Tennessee, recently voted to cancel their subscriptions to a local newspaper because in its column of Negro social news it prefixed names with Mr. or Mrs.

COMMONWEALTH, a pro-fascist magazine published in Florida, contains in its current issue an enthusiastic description of Hitler's Strength Through Joy movement. "In short," the article concludes, "the aim [of Strength Through Joy] would be to insure a happy and harmonious home life for each family and social security for every member of National Socialistic Germany."

ACCORDING TO persistent rumors in Washington, A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, is receiving religious instruction preparatory to entering the Roman Catholic church.

FROM THE NATION for September 19: "He is outspoken and has the courage to say, for example, that for this country, and in general, civilian defense is a more or less useless luxury and bad for morale" (Ralph Bates reviewing James Reston's "Prelude to Victory"); "A reader of this book can discover not only what is necessary to civilian defense but why it is necessary, and be enthusiastic in undertaking the program" (Donald W. Mitchell reviewing Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy's and Lieutenant Hodding Carter's "Civilian Defense of the United States").

BEFORE THE WAR Negroes accounted for 12 per cent of the workers on WPA. Now, because white workers have left to take war jobs and Negroes remain, the ratio has risen to over 20 per cent.

CORRECTION: On September 19 this column reported that two major-party candidates in the California primaries had lost the nomination of their own party but won the nomination of the party they opposed. The story went on to say that each would run for office under the standards of the party he was fighting. Several California readers have informed *The Nation* that election laws prevent this. The candidates can run only as independents in a write-in campaign.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

BOOKS and the ARTS

CONSTANCE ROURKE IN THE CRITICS' DEN

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

THE heading of this article may seem unkind in view of the fact that the comments on Miss Rourke's post-humorous book of essays, "The Roots of American Culture" (Harcourt, Brace, \$3), have been "favorable" with one exception; that even in that case her dismissal by the reviewer was reserved for the last two paragraphs and obviously, as the old saying goes, hurt him more than it did Miss Rourke. But I have in mind not only the critical lions who have appreciated her work but those who have never, publicly at least, deigned to taste her wares; and the further circumstance that the critical lions of the second part have, I suspect, been confirmed in their original prejudice by the very identity of the critical lions of the first part. The fact that Miss Rourke's admirers have a tendency to diminish her stature by seizing upon those elements which nourish their own particular interests does not help matters.

Miss Rourke, in other words, has become enmeshed in a critical quarrel which is today particularly sharp. It turns upon various issues; the one which has pertinence here is the concern or lack of concern with American materials. The pro-Americans tend to aggrandize the home town, whether it be the genteel New England of Van Wyck Brooks or the "wholesome" anti-intellectual hinterland. On the other side is what for lack of a better term I shall call the avant-garde. In principle these critics espouse the international point of view, which is sound; in practice their internationalism takes the form of an extreme preoccupation with Europe and an exaggerated fear of being associated with what they call the chauvinistic school, or of showing any undue interest in American folk or folks as such. The paradox is that they are often far to the left in politics and are therefore committed to a belief in "the people." But "the people" tend to become an abstraction, especially since in America they have persistently failed to fit into the required specifications.

The roots of this dispute are entangled in an old division which we inherited from Europe, the separation of our artistic-intellectual life from common "popular" life. It is a genuinely tragic estrangement—particularly in a country aspiring to be a democracy—which weakens the fiber of both elements and which the artist-intellectual, since he is that, should at least attempt to bridge over. Instead, from long buffeting, he has tended to accept the separation not only as inevitable but as a matter for pride touched with self-pity.

Mr. Brooks's attacks on "coterie writers" have been motivated in part by a consciousness of this estrangement. The trouble is that instead of filling the high role of a critical mediator between "the poet and the people" he has defended the people at the expense of the poet. His attacks on writers between the two wars for being unconstructive and pessimistic, his petulant jibes at expatriates, verge on philistinism, in

spite of the intellectual reservations with which he sprinkles his emotional judgments. The implied assumption that writers of integrity are deliberately pessimistic shows, among other things, an astounding lack of understanding of the creative process; it also confirms the people, who make a fetish of optimism and the happy ending, in their scorn for the artistic breed.

Van Wyck Brooks assumed the task of preparing the beginnings and fragments of Miss Rourke's work-in-progress for publication in the present book, and he has done a conscientious job. Four of the five reviews I have seen were written by Lewis Mumford, John Chamberlain, Lewis Gannett, and R. L. Duffus. None of these four can be set down, in any strict sense, as disciples of Brooks; but all of them, by sentiment or conviction or both, tend in his direction, and all of them are more or less out of favor with the avant-garde of American criticism.

Inevitably the editing presence of Mr. Brooks tends to identify Miss Rourke's views with his own; it also accounts for the sudden discovery, in some quarters, that Miss Rourke was important—which arouses conflicting feelings in one who knew it all along. Mr. Mumford's article about Miss Rourke in the *Saturday Review of Literature* was an excellent appraisal in itself. Yet to my mind he showed bad taste and worse strategy—since the whole admirable burden of his review was the demand for a wider recognition of her work—when, to prove that there was no hint of "isolationism" or chauvinism in her point of view, he said that she had been "almost alone among our American intellectuals" to accept the challenge to action of *his* book "Men Must Act"—thus injecting into the consideration of the work of Constance Rourke the strong partisanship for and against the views of Lewis Mumford.

John Chamberlain's review in the daily *New York Times* was intelligent; he ground no personal axes. Yet in the purlieu of my "critics' den" his praise was probably convincing only to those who were already convinced. Lewis Gannett, in the *Herald Tribune*, put her projected three-volume "essay" in the same category as Parrington's "Main Currents in American Thought" and then concentrated on the more picturesque findings of her long research, which make good copy. R. L. Duffus, in the *Times Sunday Book Review*, wallowed, as Miss Rourke forever scorned to do, in a sweet nostalgia for early America.

The avant-garde has, up to now, pretty consistently ignored Miss Rourke's exploration of the American past. I may be doing certain individuals an injustice—it is for that reason that I do not mention names—but it is my impression that many of the critics whom I respect on other grounds have dismissed Constance Rourke, sight unseen, as a scholarly

female folklorist whose "antiquarian" discoveries were at best charming but irrelevant to the high purposes of criticism and at worst chauvinistic in effect if not in intention. Their "sophistication," in other words, has kept them from even being aware that the arch of her scholarly, historical, in a sense archaeological, reconstruction of American culture was a critical synthesis which took account of as much relevant data, both foreign and domestic, as she was able to gather in thirty years; and that it was on the merits of that synthesis that she herself persistently demanded to be judged.

I am making the same demand for what seem to me important reasons. The issues with which Miss Rourke was passionately concerned for thirty years are major issues, highly relevant to the present as well as the future of American culture; the synthesis she arrived at takes account, on a high plane, of the valid elements—as opposed to the by now personal and vested interests—on both sides of the wasteful controversy I have sketched.

One of Miss Rourke's underlying critical purposes might be said to have been the reconciliation between the artist and society. Her own orientation was clear and unswerving: it stemmed from her concern—which was central—with the problem of the creative worker. In America, she felt, it was primarily a cultural problem. As I said in reviewing Maxwell Geismar's "Writers in Crisis," Americans in general not only lack knowledge, except of the most superficial sort, of backgrounds and traditions, they often display an almost defiant non-interest, a kind of snobbism in reverse, which denies their importance and their relevance to the present. One of the dismal results, on the literary side, is the endless repetition of self-education-in-a-vacuum so wearily set forth in the autobiographical pre-novels that are endemic in this country. Miss Rourke believed that to exercise his talents freely and effectively

the writer must know, as Eliot has said, "the mind of his own country—a mind which he learns in time to be much more important than his own private mind." . . . Many artists have worked supremely well with little encouragement; few have worked without a rich traditional store from which consciously or unconsciously they have drawn. The difficult task of discovering and diffusing the materials of the American tradition—many of them still buried—belongs for the most part to criticism; the artist will steep himself in the gathered light. In the end he may use native sources as a point of radical departure; he may seldom be intent upon early materials; but he will discover a relationship with the many streams of native character and feeling. The single writer—the single production—will no longer stand solitary or aggressive but within a natural sequence.

II

Constance Rourke's working life was spent charting the mind and especially the imagination of her own country. In undertaking her exploration of the forms it has assumed she laid down two principles: (1) that the American mind and imagination are necessarily distinctive from any other, though we have obviously inherited the general forms of culture developed by Western civilization; (2) that a culture cannot be equated to the fine arts, a range of the "peaks of achievement" suspended in blue air, but comprises "the whole configuration in the particular period . . . with its

special tenacities, currents of thought, contagions of feeling, its dominant arts, whether these are polite or impolite, practical or impractical, whether they slip over surfaces in transitory popular forms or become rooted as patterns of the folk imagination or, more broadly, of the social imagination."

These principles seem self-evident, yet they challenge assumptions, largely unconscious and for that reason all the more deeply imbedded, that have dominated the American attitude toward culture since America began: that our culture, if we ever achieved one, would be merely an extension of European culture to be transferred by means of "carriers," and that culture somehow equates the fine arts. This latter view, which "took shape here through the establishment of the classic ideal at precisely the time when our first consciousness of the fine arts emerged," tended to deny or minimize any organic connection between folk or popular expression and the fine arts, which were associated with a wealth and leisure we could patently not hope to possess for decades to come. Miss Rourke believed, on the contrary, that popular expression, embodying as it does native experience, traditions, craftsmanship, is part of the rich soil out of which the fine arts ultimately spring; that while in this country there was and could be no such thing as the folk in the European sense of a single homogeneous, long-settled, closely knit community, its function in furnishing the "tillage" for the fine arts was performed by the people, common and uncommon, whose skills and whose bents of feeling and thinking were European but whose expression was modified and changed by the distinctive social, political, and geographical elements in their new environment. American houses soon became adaptations rather than copies; American drama and acting were influenced by the new and overwhelming experience of the Indian as well as by Shakespeare; Jefferson was a product of both Europe and America; the mythology of Europe took on an American dimension in the tall tales of the ever-moving frontier. Some of Miss Rourke's most fruitful work was done in this last field, for in the myths of a people is to be found the record of its imagination in the making—its early literature, as Edith Hamilton points out in her fresh interpretation, "Mythology," recently published.

Through all this Miss Rourke was not concerned with proving that American culture was superior; quite the contrary. She did assert that "art has always taken on a special native fiber before it assumes the larger growth" and that this larger growth in America, though it was bound to be slow in any case, has been further hindered by the wide acceptance of an inorganic conception of culture, of which imitation is the core.

The essays in the present book are in various stages of completion. The title essay is a beautiful and finished statement of the argument of the whole work. Some of the others, I feel sure, would have been incorporated, expanded, or reduced, though every one of them is studded with insights and enough provocative ideas to keep half a dozen writers busy for years: the idea, for instance, that Puritanism and materialism have borne too heavy a share of blame for artistic failure in this country; the suggestion that the novel may not be natural to us, that ours, indeed, may not be a

literary culture, as we have tended, under the weight of English influence, to think it must be; that motion, as well as equilibrium, may nourish the creative impulse; and many others.

To obtain any adequate view of the final significance of her work-in-progress, it is necessary to go back to "American Humor," a basic book which has been scandalously neglected. In that volume, which is subtitled *A Study of the National Character*, Miss Rourke traced the patternings of the American grain; in the second half of the book she brought all her scholarship and thought and feeling to bear in placing our major writers in relation to the "many sequences of the American tradition on the popular side as well as on purely literary levels." The result is a perspective in which such apparently disparate figures as the Yankee peddler and Henry James, the "comic poets" of the frontier and Emily Dickinson, fall into place as representative and related manifestations of the American imagination. "The Roots of American Culture," finished, would have placed all the arts similarly in focus.

In "American Humor" I found for the first time a critical perspective of American expression which allowed room and significance not only to Emerson's essay on Self-Reliance, which I read in school, but to the tall tales that were part of my non-school experience in a small Western city. More than anyone else I have ever encountered, she saw America whole.

I have found this perspective continuously relevant and useful. And as I reread "American Humor" it seems to me that only a person who had not taken it in could say, as Alfred Kazin did in the *New Republic*, that "Constance Rourke failed us by not drawing the wealth of patterns and skills she had uncovered into our 'natural sequence' now, our contemporary predicament and need. . . . Commemoration, somehow, is never enough." Miss Rourke would have omitted that quibbling "somehow." She not only proclaimed her critical objective, over and over again, to be a synthesis that would be relevant to our "contemporary predicament." She actually accomplished it, on the limited scale of a single volume, in "American Humor." She "failed us" by dying before she could complete her task.

The first-rate critic is rare, for he must join manifold abilities seldom found in combination. He must have a capacity for large general ideas and a sure taste in the minute particulars of form and expression; he must be able to distinguish between the genuine and the false. He must be an order maker; and his order will be meaningless unless he has a sense of proportion that mediates continuously between the general and the particular. Miss Rourke was forever aware of these responsibilities, and she met them, in my opinion, to an extraordinary degree. Compare, for instance, her estimates of writers in "American Humor" with the sorry mistaken judgments in the final anti-climactic sections of Parrington; compare her understanding and her celebration of Henry James with Van Wyck Brooks's violent emotional rejection. Consider in the present book the hard-headed, anti-antiquarian Note on Folklore; observe her unerring detection of the fake "folk" in the paintings of Grant Wood. In addition she was a writer whose prose is so translucent that only its final impact reminds the reader of the massive scholarship assimilated within it.

Profile of "The War Years"

STORM OVER THE LAND: A PROFILE OF THE CIVIL WAR. By Carl Sandburg. Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$3.50.

CARL SANDBURG inhabits the Civil War scene with more awareness and robust vigor than men of slower pulses bring to the crises of their own times. His two works on Abraham Lincoln, "The Prairie Years" and "The War Years," have attained great popularity because he has the art of communicating his own gusto to his readers, for while gusto may not be a requisite of good historical writing, it is indispensable to attracting a large audience to a history book.

"Storm Over the Land" is nothing less and very little more than a condensation of the four volumes of "The War Years." It has been, in Sandburg's phrase, "carved mainly from the pages" of the earlier work. The operation was skilfully performed by Elisabeth Bevier Hamilton, with whom the idea originated. It has resulted in a swift and straightforward story which, while it lacks the magnificence of the original volumes, has dispensed with their formidable length and occasional turgidness.

The avoidance of repetitious or cumbersome detail is one of the conspicuous merits of this shortened version. To take a single example, the subject of office-seekers, which occupied about seventy pages of "The War Years," has been reduced to eight lines, plus a joke by Petroleum V. Nasby. Sandburg's tremendous sentence of forty-six semicolons on "the intricate tale of the shaping of a national fate" has been slashed to twenty-one semicolons. For the most part, his sentences ring as smartly as men marching in quickstep.

The ebullient masses of facts and the torrents of quotations have necessarily been sacrificed. The violet-tinted passages are reduced, but the reader will still find enough of spindrift, seed-time, and crimson mist, sufficient birthing hours and slants of silver moons to assure him that here is authentic Sandburg. The elements of his highly individual style—save only the toppling superabundance of detail—are all retained: the vein of mystical poetry, the generalization lighted by the flash of example, the corn-belt humor, the touches of highfalutin rhetoric, the salty smack of anecdote. Idiosyncrasy is not lacking. Sandburg's passion for reporting the number of bullets found in trees after a battle is almost startling in a book which has small space for irrelevancies. There is little irony. It appears that the man is too simple and wholehearted for irony; but his simplicity is delusive, because it is wise. He can speak with penetration, as in his comment on Lincoln's address at Gettysburg: "His outwardly smooth sentences were inside of them gnarled and tough with the enigmas of the American experiment." He can speak with deep comprehension of "the capacity of so many men, women, and children for hating and fearing what they do not understand while believing they do understand completely and perfectly what no one understands except tentatively and hazardingly." And he can summon in a phrase the agony of ravaged Georgia—"the desolation and fallen pride and hunger and deathly quiet lacking majesty because of the smoldering foul smoke and the clean air pungent with the rot and stink of conquest." It is writ-

ing of such noble eloquence that makes it necessary to forgive Sandburg for fustian like "The gambler's factor grew, and the dice of destiny shook in the hands of Humpty Dumpty"; or the bathos of referring to Booth and Lincoln as the Outsider and the Human Target.

The book is profusely illustrated with photographs and drawings, happily selected to enhance the interest of the text. They include an enlarged sketch of the soldier's familiar companion, *pediculus vestimenti*.

"The War Years" ended with the splendid description of Lincoln's funeral pageant and his interment at Springfield. For the conclusion of "Storm Over the Land," Sandburg has chosen a post-war anecdote which was included, inconspicuously in the longer work.

To General Robert E. Lee in northern Virginia one day came a young mother. She wanted his blessing for her baby. He took the little one in his arms, looked at it, looked at her. Then came the slow words: "Teach him he must deny himself."

Without questioning either the value of discipline or the distinguished character of General Lee, one may wonder why Sandburg elected to end his vigorous book on a note of negation and defeat.

MARGARET LEECH

The Nazis and the German Army

THE GUILT OF THE GERMAN ARMY. By Hans Ernest Fried. The Macmillan Company. \$3.50.

THERE has been a tendency to regard the German army leaders as dupes of the Nazis in the sense that the agrarian reactionaries of the type of Rauschning were dupes. In some quarters false hopes of an officer-class revolt have been based on this absurd error. That it is an error Mr. Fried shows in this rigorous and well-documented book, which sets out to prove that the German militarists of the Second Reich were the senior and originating partners in a deliberate combination. One may believe that a little too much stress has been placed on the role of the army without in the least diminishing the importance of this book. It is no hobby horse Mr. Fried rides, but a very lively animal of a recognizable color. And I think the author makes his point, that even to this day there is approximate equality of power between the army and the party, with extremely little possibility that the partnership will break up. "The army and the party are tools, each of the other, but neither is master. Together they rule the people," Mr. Fried says.

The strategic detour by which the militarists achieved their aim is something that our political strategists ought to understand as well as they know the way through the corridors of the OWI. To secure direct control of Germany was useless for the purposes of militarization. The essence of the post-war period was that it was an epoch of pacifism. Direct army control would have been too naked and unideological a rule. An efficient militarism cannot be imposed by force. All that can be produced that way is an Italian army. The task of the German militarists was to remake Germany in their image, and for this a party with an emotional and pseudo-intellectual appeal was necessary.

Mr. Fried oversimplifies a little, I believe, in making this

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
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fundamental point. It was not any objection to collective bargaining that made the militarists desire the suppression of the trade unions, he says, but the fact that the unions were anti-militarist. Collective bargaining is always regarded as subversive by militarists. Only the other day an American admiral told the A. F. of L. convention that Germany, Italy, and Japan were doing very well without unions and so could America. Professional militarists, of course, never think very highly of industrialists, bankers, and newspaper proprietors, and so do not use their language in attacking the unions; but the German militarists had enough political understanding to grasp the fact that they needed not merely a nationalist ideology but a dictatorial one, based upon a deceptive appropriation of the things nearest to the popular mind—socialism, security, and peace.

Even the special apologetic doctrines of Nazism were invented long before Nazism—the “stab in the back” theory, for instance. The claim that the army was stabbed in the back by the German revolution of November, 1918, was the intellectual device adopted by the officer caste to rid themselves of the shame of defeat. History shows, however, that it was the German General Staff which first acknowledged defeat and demanded an armistice, not the Reichstag, and much less any truly popular organ of opinion. As early as August the General Staff had told Wilhelm II that victory was impossible, while President Wilson received the first German demand for an armistice on October 3.

The November days did no more than put an end to useless slaughter. They did not even weaken the German negotiators very much, for the accumulation of American force would have swept away all resistance before long. Yet despite documented testimony to the contrary, the myth of the “stab in the back” was in circulation early in 1919, when Hitler was a mere anti-bolshevist “education officer” in a reactionary regiment. The myth reflected the atmosphere of the frightened and venomous ruling class, but it was no more than a tool in the hands of the quite unfrightened militarists.

There never has been any important anti-war faction in the German officer caste, Mr. Fried insists. Reactionaries have often urged us to believe the contrary in the hope of getting us to accept a new form of appeasement. Certain German exiles, more anxious to save a Junker Germany than to rid Europe of a nightmare, have engaged in what they would have us regard as well-intentioned conspiracy in the interests of peace. Rauschnig, for instance, in the summer of 1939 could serve as an intermediary between what he asserted to be an anti-war group of German staff officers and Daladier’s pet general. Nothing came of it of course, and nothing will come of hopes placed in the military caste in general. The army will only turn against the party, says Mr. Fried, in order to save the army in defeat (as Ludendorff pleaded for an armistice in September, 1918, in order to protect his army from destruction). Only this, or a self-contradictory betrayal of the values of militarism by the Nazis, could divide the two forces.

On this point Mr. Fried and Howard K. Smith, author of “Last Train from Berlin” are not in absolute agreement. One of the most important pieces of information that Mr. Smith had to give us was that the S. A. had been virtually

abolished while the S. S. had been largely incorporated into the army. The *Waffen S. S.*, enjoying higher pay and better conditions, recruits its rank and file from among the most fanatical and efficient soldiers of the army, to the disgust of the old Prussian officers. The *Waffen S. S.*, like the *Falange* troops in Spain, have chiefly repressive work to do. When the miserable Balkan accomplices and the German army had battered themselves into exhaustion in taking Sevastopol, it was the *Waffen S. S.* that marched in behind the front-line fighters to take over the city. Thus Hitler gathers a special army around him, while the generals’ army grows relatively weaker, Mr. Smith says. The information is of the greatest value, but having read Mr. Fried I cannot agree with Mr. Smith’s lightly touched suggestion that these S. S. divisions might be used against the generals. As Mr. Smith admits, their major purpose is clear. They are to be used if—. If what?

Hitler began his career, Mr. Fried reminds us, as the “political commissar” of counter-revolutionary regiments. It was he who after the Hamburg revolt served as nationalist propagandist in the volunteer regiments that had been used against the Hamburg working class. Back at his starting-point, Hitler is organizing his new private army, to be pitted against the people on their day of wrath.

RALPH BATES

On Language

THE GIFT OF TONGUES. By Margaret Schlauch. Modern Age Books. \$3.50.

THE NATURE OF LITERATURE: ITS RELATION TO SCIENCE, LANGUAGE AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE. By Thomas Clark Pollock. Princeton University Press. \$3.

THE GIFT OF TONGUES” is a rare phenomenon. It is a popularly written book which can be read for pleasure but is in no sense a popularization. It covers the whole subject of the science of language, it is sound philology, and it rides no hobbies.

In two of its chapters, on Semantics and on Language and Poetic Creation, it discusses with stimulating concreteness the questions developed in a more rarefied manner in “The Nature of Literature.” The purpose of this book, in Professor Pollock’s own words, “is to lay a theoretical basis for the investigation of literature as a social phenomenon in terms which are consonant both with our contemporary knowledge of language and with the development of modern science.” It is a lesson for the dry-as-dust scholars who are sometimes inclined to forget that the important thing is the literary work itself rather than the circumstances surrounding its production and the theorists who forget that the ultimate test of a work of literature must be its relation to the fundamental frame of value in which it is judged.

The main criticism to be made of the book is that its answer to the question implied in the title emerges from a discussion which would have benefited by more concreteness, directness, and compression. It is evident that by literature Professor Pollock really means literature as the common

reader understands it, as may be inferred from his succinct summary of the uses of language:

In *phatic communion* one person uses words to come into relation with another. In *referential symbolism* one person uses words to direct the attention of another to certain referents: if this is his controlling purpose, the use is *pure referential*: if his purpose is also to arouse attitudes or actions in connection with the referents, the use is *pragmatic-referential*. In *evocative symbolism* one person uses words to evoke a controlled experience (E) in another: if he does this in order to express an experience of his own, the use is *literature* (L): if his concern, however, is only to evoke an experience (E) in the other, the use is *pseudo-literature*.

This is sound theory and sound common sense (by "phatic communion" he has previously explained that he means "chit-chat"), and when boiled down says nothing which the common reader does not instinctively recognize as true. And (E) and (L) should reassure the professors.

JAMES ORRICK

William Sowden Sims

ADMIRAL SIMS AND THE MODERN AMERICAN NAVY. By Elting E. Morison. Houghton Mifflin Company. \$5.

IN THE dedication to his splendid book Mr. Morison pays homage to "the Insurgent Spirit and to Those Officers Who Have Maintained It Within the United States Navy in Time of Peace." The problem of mediocrity and lack of progressive thinking in high places in our army and navy has never been more urgent than during the past several years. And in no other major country is there so little understanding of basic military and naval principles as in the United States. The army and navy, alternately petted and neglected, receive neither the constructive criticism nor the support which their importance demands. Since only war affords an opportunity to put new theories to a test, the higher officers are inevitably conservative. The only real force compelling progress, therefore, is that handful of men who have the vision to perceive existing evils and the probable needs of the future.

In selecting William Sowden Sims as the subject for a four-year research in naval insurgency Mr. Morison could not possibly have made a wiser choice. Though extremely indiscreet, Sims possessed far better balance and much greater wisdom than his less fortunate acquaintance General William Mitchell. While he spent his entire adult life attacking abuses, generally as a junior officer, he stopped just short of saying or doing the unforgivable thing which would have put an end to his reforms.

It is to the credit of the author that he understands both the details and the spirit of this extremely useful life. Sims was a muckraker and reformer, a naval counterpart of Upton Sinclair and Lincoln Steffens. Few men in all military history can have attempted to improve so many things or, without dictatorial powers, scored so many successes. Poor gunnery, promotion by seniority, department organization, ship design, destroyer tactics, the Annapolis system of education,

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neglect of the Naval War College, the significance of air power in sea war, all received his attention. In gunnery, where he had the support of President Theodore Roosevelt and a genuinely free hand, the range, rapidity, and accuracy of American shooting were multiplied several hundred per cent in one decade. In some fields his contributions passed unnoticed because they eliminated chances of disaster, but in those where his efforts were unrewarded, as in the organization of the Navy Department and methods of promotion, recent events have underlined only too painfully the correctness of his views. His declaration twenty years ago that "the plane carrier is the battleship of the future" caused wincing throughout his entire profession, but had the United States acted on that belief its position in the western Pacific might be much better than it is today.

Because the naval activities of the United States in World War I were unspectacular, most persons have regarded them as unimportant. Yet nothing could be farther from the truth. It was the introduction of the convoy which defeated the U-boat and finally prevented German victory; and it was the persistent urging of Sims, more than any other factor, that broke the mental paralysis with which the Admiralty was seized in 1917 and earned the convoy a trial. Too much credit can scarcely be given him for the satisfactory relations that prevailed between the American and British navies.

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It is to Mr. Morison's credit that Sims the individual is not lost sight of in his consideration of Sims the historical personage. Born with a happy, buoyant personality, boundless energy, a critical eye, and a constructive mind, he attempted to improve virtually everything with which he came in contact. More than any professional pacifist he distrusted the "military mind." A splendid leader beloved by most of the men he commanded, he was decidedly less satisfactory as a subordinate. A disregard of public opinion combined with a strong social conscience explained his lectures urging that war be outlawed and his dismay when sanctions were not invoked against Japan and Italy, his denunciation of the Treasury raids by war veterans, and his reference to Irish Americans who insisted on transporting their prejudices to the United States as the "jackass vote." One reporter commented that his natural element was hot water.

Like most reformers he had faults. Far too apt to interpret opposition to his suggestions as due either to laziness or stupidity, he was also sufficiently conceited to feel that obstacles in his path were placed there for personal reasons. In some instances, as in his opposition to the North Sea mine barrage, he was completely wrong. Often his proposed remedies for complex evils were over-simple, and if they had been adopted would have led to worse troubles than those they were designed to correct.

In his Preface Mr. Morison apologizes for the imperfections attendant upon a military biography written by a civilian. Such apologies are quite needless in a piece of work which shows exhaustive research and which has been carefully checked by both naval officers and historians. A few errors can be found, but these are minor flaws in a volume that is certainly the best military biography to appear in many years.

DONALD W. MITCHELL

CONTRIBUTORS

HARRY BLOCK, *The Nation's* Mexican correspondent, recently organized a new publishing concern in Mexico City called Editorial Nuevo Mundo.

JAMES A. WECHSLER is on the Washington staff of *PM*.

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GUNNAR LEISTIKOW, former foreign editor, columnist, and editorial writer of the *Social-Demokraten* of Copenhagen, is now in the United States.

WILLIAM JORDY is a young free-lance writer who formerly lived in Hamilton Fish's district.

WILL CHASAN, a frequent contributor to *The Nation* and editor of its special supplement on the Dies committee, is about to enter the army.

MARGARET LEECH is the author of "Reveille in Washington, 1860-1865."

JAMES ORRICK frequently contributes book reviews to *The Nation*.

DRAMA

"The Eve of St. Mark"

TO SAY that Maxwell Anderson's new play is the best of the season so far is not to say very much. To add that it is also the finest work of its author in many a year is still not enough. In my opinion at least, "The Eve of St. Mark" (Cort Theater) is also the most effective and the most satisfactory play about the war yet to reach our stage. Some prospective spectators may be discouraged, as I myself was, by a title that is unfortunate and misleading. Its only justification is far-fetched at best, and it suggests that penchant for rather hackneyed poetic implications which has certainly been one of Mr. Anderson's besetting sins. But titles are not, after all, so very important, and the play itself may well be the "What Price Glory" of 1942—not because, despite certain scenes of very robust comedy, it resembles the latter in tone or theme, but because, like "What Price Glory," it seems so astonishingly successful in giving expression to the emotional attitudes of its moment. Audiences as well as critics take to it with enthusiasm and delight.

The main scheme of the piece is so direct and so simple that its general outline must have occurred to—and been rejected by—nearly every one of the thousands who have considered the possibility of writing an American war play. Mr. Anderson merely chronicles in many scenes the adventures of a representative young man who is taken from the farm, is introduced into the life of an army camp, gets himself engaged to a home girl on his leave, and then is torn away to meet danger and probable death on a tiny island in the Pacific. But what might have been banal or plodding is so freshly seen and felt and written that instead of being commonplace it is novel and exciting as well as completely satisfying and right. In so far as the play has a thesis it is the thesis of "Key Largo," the chief difference being that it is here stated in the positive rather than the negative: men who might continue to live do, nevertheless, sometimes choose to die simply because they know that they should, and know it even though they cannot put into words the nature of the obligation; even though, indeed, every argument they can muster seems to prove to them that the final sacrifice is one which no man need require of himself. Yet this thesis is certainly not the

thing one is most aware of during the course of a play which remains always more a chronicle than an argument and maintains a tone as often tender and gay as it is tragic or even somber. To state the thesis is certainly to leave one still wondering just why the whole is as engrossing as it proves to be.

One answer is, of course, merely that Mr. Anderson has never before more convincingly demonstrated the fact that he has the born playwright's gift of carrying conviction and of making one feel that the familiar has never really been seen or felt before. Take, for instance, one of the most inevitable of many inevitable scenes—that in which the hero and one of his companions meet two young semi-professional tarts in a juke-box cafe. Few playwrights could escape the long-familiar clichés, but Mr. Anderson escapes them so completely that the scene is one of the best of the play—funny, touching, terribly real, and a necessary part of a vast drama which manages to involve everybody in one way or another. Much the same could be said of most of the other scenes, whether they are concerned with the domestic life of a man suddenly called upon to become a soldier, with that soldier when he is practicing his terrible new profession, or with the grotesque life of the training camp, where a man has been freed from the obligations of ordinary life without having yet really assumed those of his new career. But the technical excellence of the scenes is still not enough to account for the total effect of the play, and I am thrown back upon something alluded to at the beginning of this analysis—upon the fact that "The Eve of St. Mark" is so astonishingly successful in its attempt to express the emotional attitudes of a particular moment.

No previous play of the present war seems to me to have done that. Those sent us from England have been either feebly conceived or ineffectually written, but even had they been technically and artistically better, they would still have been, in some respects, inappropriate here. They were written by, for, and about a people whose experience with the present conflict is so much longer and so much more violent than ours that their attitudes are very different, and the plays which express those attitudes inevitably seem strange and remote to us, however interesting they may be. Nor were "Watch on the Rhine" and "There Shall Be No Light" much closer. They told us what we ought to feel rather than what we actu-

ally did feel or were even ready to feel. And for that reason they also did not come home to our hearts and bosoms. But in "The Eve of St. Mark" we see ourselves at this moment. Its subject is the experiences we have actually had; its emotional level as well as its emotional tone is ours; and the play is therefore capable, as no other war play has been, of performing one of the important functions of art. It gives clarity and coherence and logic to our emotional reaction to certain great events; it provides an occasion upon which a group may feel in an orderly and clear fashion what the individual members of that group have been feeling fragmentarily and in confusion. "What Price Glory" channeled the disillusion which followed the last war; "The Eve of St. Mark" channels those emotions which we feel as we enter a greater conflict. In it the author is not primarily either an advocate or a prophet. He has somehow succeeded in making himself a spokesman, and artistically the effect is very fine indeed. Too many people have told us what we ought to feel and scolded us for not feeling it. Mr. Anderson puts our reply into words and scenes. This is what we are doing and thinking. And it is not so inadequate after all.

Two other recent productions demand brief notice. "Let Freedom Sing" (Belasco Theater) is another of those miniature reviews put on by very young performers. I found it gay, refreshing, and funny. "Strip for Action" (National Theater) is an elaborate, sprawling, and obstreperous farce about a burlesque troupe in an army camp. Many seem to find it stupendously funny, but

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to me its combination of sentiment, bawdy, and patriotism was merely embarrassing. JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

MUSIC

THREE instrumental sections of Berlioz's Symphony "Romeo and Juliet" have been played by Toscanini before: (1) Romeo Alone—Sadness—Concert and Ball—Great Festivities in Capulet's Palace; (2) Love Scene (with the introductory Capulet's Garden omitted); (3) Queen Mab. They include some of the most beautiful music of the work; and in performing the symphony in its entirety at the opening concerts of the New York Philharmonic-Symphony Society Toscanini provided a first hearing of two other astounding pieces of music, Juliet's Funeral Procession and Romeo in the Family Vault of the Capulets, as well as the impressive instrumental Introduction, the vocal Prologue, with its completely different and exquisite Queen Mab, and the Finale, which descends to mere operatic grandiloquence.

The best parts of this symphony are enough to make it one of the great works of the musical literature of all times—which brings up the question why this should have been the first complete performance in the twenty-five years of my experience as a concert-goer. One reason is that the work requires a chorus, which an orchestral society can engage only once or twice a season, and which it will engage then for Beethoven's Ninth Symphony unless a conductor presses, like Toscanini, for the Missa Solemnis, or Verdi's Requiem, or now Berlioz's "Romeo and Juliet." There is the question why it took Toscanini so long to insist on "Romeo and Juliet"; but other conductors undoubtedly are influenced by the fact that they will have a success with the Ninth Symphony that they will not have with Berlioz's work, which is more difficult to play well and does not impress the public.

"The general public has no imagination; accordingly pieces which appeal solely to the imagination have no public," said Berlioz when he recommended the omission of Romeo in the Family Vault of the Capulets; and there were other sections which did not seem to be making much of an impression on some of the people at the recent performances. For one thing Berlioz's thought and language and style are completely individual, completely unrelated to any-

thing else the public hears, and above all to the German music it hears most of the time. What they require to become better understood is the familiarity born of frequent hearings; but because the music is not understood it is infrequently played. What they require also is that the listener be receptive; but even when he hears the music he listens with ears and mind prejudiced against it by what is written about it.

In an article on critics in the *American Scholar* a few years ago Dr. Paul Henry Lang wrote: "What have they done to help the growing millions of music lovers on their way to the appreciation of great music? They have not only failed to guide them but worse than that have frequently misguided them. Wherever we turn our eyes, to daily reports, articles in the music section of the Sunday papers, or program notes, we are confronted with a thick tangle of prejudices, inherited formulas and catchwords, a prodigious lack of information, and an unbelievable ignorance of musical literature." In continental Europe "newspapers have opened their columns to musical scholars"; and that, it was indicated, was what they would have to do here. Now I would not dispute Dr. Long's evaluation of the writings of our musical journalists; but I have not yet encountered in the writings of our scholars anything that leads me to believe the public will get the guidance it needs from them. The public, if it is wise, will listen to Berlioz without the help of Mr. Downes; but also without the help of Dr. Einstein, whose statements about "Romeo and Juliet" and "The Damnation of Faust," as I pointed out a while ago, were a restatement of "inherited formulas and catchwords" that betrayed "an unbelievable ignorance" of the music. And also without the help of Dr. Lang himself.

In the article I have mentioned he discussed one of the errors which the critics encouraged instead of fighting—"the worship of the big, the long, the ponderous, and the loud," of which one manifestation was Stokowski's "gigantic orchestral paraphrases of [Bach's] spiritual songs, of . . . intimate chorale preludes . . . and of works for chamber orchestra and solo violin." And he wrote: "The trend toward grandiloquence was a product of the romantic era, and the musical taste of our public has its roots in the musical style of that period. The musicians of the last century, from Berlioz to Strauss . . ., expressed their thoughts by large gestures

and used a complicated, at times even enormous, technical apparatus. It was therefore concluded that deep poetical feeling cannot be expressed without an intricate form of execution. . . . Today we wonder why musicians of judgment were captivated by orchestral scores which when dispossessed of their tremendous orchestral ornaments show an astonishingly meager invention and vague construction."

This did not dispose the mind of a reader of the *American Scholar* to appreciate the beauty, effectiveness, and honesty of some of the music of Berlioz that would be so strange to his ears, or its delicacy, finesse, subtlety, economy. It did not prepare him for the affecting loveliness of the sustained melodies—in Romeo Alone and the Love Scene—that move and turn in such unusual and such exquisite ways; for the enchantment of Capulet's silent, starlit garden produced by the strings *pppp*, the two flutes *pp*, the few notes of the distant horn; for the musical evocation of the scene of the two lovers, achieved with such poetic insight and such reticence; for the sheer orchestral magic of Queen Mab; for the poignancy of the single note reiterated *pp* at intervals by the chorus over the orchestra's fugal march, in Juliet's Funeral Procession. It did not prepare him for the brilliance of Great Festivities in Capulet's Palace, the shattering power of Romeo in the Vault of the Capulets, in which large means are used with no less originality and discretion and honesty. I stress this honesty because Dr. Lang impugned it. One encounters things in Berlioz's scores, Toscanini said, that one cannot understand or imagine—until one hears them from the orchestra, when their poetic purpose and their marvelous rightness for this purpose become clear. Dr. Lang did not help his reader to understand this—to understand that Berlioz's musical thought has an orchestral form of which one cannot "dispossess" it without doing it the violence that Stokowski's transcriptions do Bach. One can say the same thing of Strauss's "Don Quixote"; and if one does not merely count instruments but considers what is said with them, one finds "the big, the long, the ponderous, and the loud" in Brahms, whom Dr. Lang described as "the lonely retrospective musician who was trying to save the glory of classical art in a world engulfed in the dramatic frenzy of the Neo-German School."

The performance of "Romeo" I will discuss later. B. H. HAGGIN

October 24, 1942

Letters to the Editors

and—Friend or Enemy?

Dear Sirs: I think it is now time to begin counting noses and to declare that those who are not for us in this struggle for life are against us.

I agree most heartily with your position regarding Vichy France—that it ought to be regarded as either a friend or an enemy. It ought no longer be permitted a half-and-half stand. But I think you should take a similar unmistakable stand with respect to other countries of vital concern to us. I think our country will soon have to insist that Chile and the Argentine make a choice between us and the Axis. The time is past when they can continue aid to the Axis and still demand our friendship.

But the country most vitally important to us at the present time is Ireland—Southern Ireland. Why you should feel that you have to handle the Irish with kid gloves is a mystery. You have fought their quarrel with England over a period of years and have proved to be one of their most valuable friends. Now that our very life is at stake I think you have the right to demand their support of our cause. As it is, it would be far better for us if Ireland were an out-and-out enemy. Then we could take measures to safeguard our interests.

You keep demanding a second front, and I think you are right. But anyone with even a small amount of military knowledge knows that a second front is impossible with a country like Southern Ireland on our exposed flank. The dog-in-the-manger attitude that Southern Ireland has taken practically guarantees Hitler against a second front—at least for some time to come. If Southern Ireland does not change its attitude very shortly it ought to be declared in the ranks of the enemy and suffer the loss of all future help and sympathy from this country. And when this war is over and England moves to rectify this error of judgment of hers—from a military point of view—in not retaining control of Southern Ireland, all of us in this country will rejoice at such a move and feel that England is thoroughly justified. For the military control of Southern Ireland is just as much a protection for us as for England.

R. W. PENCE

Greencastle, Ind., October 16

Second Front at Dakar

Dear Sirs: Without being a military expert in any sense, I believe that Dakar as a secondary offensive front offers such obviously good prospects for the United Nations that it is disturbing to find that this would conflict with the resolve of the State Department to keep Vichy a neutral. In this connection, the elevation of Admiral Leahy to a place of tactical authority is completely discouraging, since it makes it unlikely that the necessary action will be taken.

This is the time to reread "The War Years" by Carl Sandburg, especially since the view is being frequently expressed that Lincoln understood the advantage of delay. The truth is that he understood the need of impatience, and he condemned the generals who suffered from what he described as "the slows." Incidentally, Sandburg shows how much of the dissension and conflict between Northern factions was finally resolved once a firm policy of attack, with all its casualties, was undertaken.

THEODORE A. TENOR

Beaver Falls, Pa., October 15

Sympathy for Mr. Voorhis

Dear Sirs: Charles Van Devander, in his article on the Dies committee in the supplement to the October 3 issue of *The Nation*, says that Representative Voorhis's "family fortune has never impinged on his social conscience." What he means by this remark I do not know, but here are some pertinent facts.

After graduation from college Mr. Voorhis made a direct study of labor conditions and labor problems by becoming a manual laborer and working in labor camps and industrial communities. Subsequently he returned to university study, received an advanced degree, and served as a college instructor in the history of labor problems. He engaged with others in a brave but unsuccessful effort to obtain for laborers in the Imperial Valley their constitutional right of assembly.

One of his most notable performances was his establishment of a school for underprivileged boys at San Dimas, California. He conducted this school until his political duties led him to give it to the state of California as a part of its educational system.

Mr. Van Devander's main criticism is that Congressman Voorhis has not interfered with the outrageous actions of the reactionary majority of the Dies committee. He ignores Mr. Voorhis's published condemnation of some of these actions and his participation in a threat of a minority report, mentioned by Kenneth Crawford in the same issue of *The Nation*, which actually prevented the publication of the majority statement as a committee report. Anyone who has served as a minority member of a committee the majority of which was determined to do as it pleased will have sympathy with Mr. Voorhis, and may wonder what he could have done under the circumstances.

BERNARD C. EWER

Claremont, Cal., October 13

Reaction to Internment

Dear Sirs: I inclose a copy of a letter from a young student in the Home Economics Department at the University of California at Berkeley who is now a prisoner at the concentration camp for American citizens of Japanese ancestry at Poston, Arizona. Your readers will perhaps like to get this succinct picture of an intelligent girl's reactions to internment.

ELMER MICHELSON

Berkeley, Cal., October 5

[The letter follows.]

When I first came I thought this place was really going to be fun and exciting because everything was so new and we met so many new friends, all Japanese of course. Yet I know that others didn't take things as I did because they weren't used to the terrific heat and dust and discomfort. We used to go to the intake to watch the new groups come in, and they always looked so tired and discouraged. . . .

About the younger generation and their attitude toward camp life, it is a sad story. It is really disgusting to see maturing personalities disintegrating. The young people around seventeen or eighteen are getting lazy, ambitionless, satisfied, and stagnating. I suppose we should blame the seeming security of camp life. We don't have to worry about our shelter, food, or clothing here, and we can get along fine without working if we choose to. Security is something that we strive for and de-

sire in any normal life, but in a place and situation like this, what awful consequences it brings! I just wonder what some of us will be like in personality and character in four or five years.

Yet camp life offers excellent opportunities to show our ingenuity and creative ability in practical ways. Since our income is so limited—by the way, after next month I'll be drawing professional wages, \$19—and there are so few things it can buy because of our location and war priorities, we are forced to think up substitutes or to make our own products. To mention a few articles we make—furniture, sandals, beautiful paper flowers, parks out of desert foliage, vases out of rock and cement, and now there is a knitting and crocheting

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craze throughout camp. There is also a wonderful opportunity here to practice a democratic civil government, if we would all take it seriously and cooperate. We get into tough spots sometimes because of the clash of ideas between the older and younger generation, but so far the results have been very democratic and farsighted. We are tending toward the principles of the consumers' cooperative more than anything else. In this way all the community enterprises will be owned by the people who patronize them and the profits can be used directly for the benefit of the people. . . .

Daily I hear reports of different friends who have been fortunate enough to leave various camps to attend universities in the East and Middle West. Some have received scholarships and others not. I'm still clinging to the hope of getting out of here, too, but I guess money is just too important to ignore. . . .

Paying for Prejudice

Dear Sirs: The United States is waging war for democracy, but the state of Missouri is paying an unbelievably high price for segregation.

Lloyd Gaines, a Negro Missourian, sought admission to the University of Missouri Law School. He was rejected because of his race. The United States Supreme Court directed the Missouri officials to admit Gaines to the white state school or establish a separate law school for Negroes. Missouri established the Lincoln University Law School in St. Louis for Negroes. It has an enrolment of sixteen students and has twelve persons on its pay roll. It is likely that before the school year is over there will be more persons on the Lincoln University Law School pay roll than students in attendance.

If the federal government would put a moderate tax on racial prejudice, Mr. Morgenthau's worries would be over.

S. R. REDMOND

St. Louis, Mo., October 14

Jim Crow in Washington

Dear Sirs: I am sure you are familiar with the Jim Crow situation in Washington, which has been such a blot on the country in peace time and which has become more of a disgrace—as well as a positive danger—now that we are at war.

The capital is now suffering from a shortage of trained street-car and bus

operators: accidents, frantic appeals are made, and men are being brought in from other cities, adding to the overcrowding. But only white men are allowed to become street-car and bus operators. There are in Washington many qualified Negroes, familiar with the city, but the Capital Transit Company flatly refuses to hire them.

To rectify this situation the Committee for Jobs for Negroes in Public Utilities has been established here. It plans to utilize agencies such as the Fair Employment Practices Commission to mobilize public opinion and to provide a channel through which qualified Negroes can be mobilized for these jobs when the time is ripe.

We feel this is an important fight, vital to the war effort and to the aims of the war. If any persons would like to give financial assistance, checks or money should be sent to the committee, care of the Y. M. C. A., Twelfth Street, N. W.

CHARLES E. GAGNIER,

Publicity Committee

Washington, October 15

Hardships Under the Law

Dear Sirs: Last year a law was passed by the United States Congress stating that American citizens could not return to foreign countries where they were born and reside there continuously unless they worked for American companies or as employees of the American government. The law created so many difficulties for American citizens living in England and Latin American countries that the date of its action was postponed until October, 1943.

The Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs is trying to promote greater sympathy between the United States and Latin America, but United States citizens born in Latin America who by living in the country of their birth could be extremely useful to it as well as to their adopted country must return here because positions in which they could represent American companies or serve the American government are limited. Hundreds of American citizens living in Latin American countries have been forced to pull up stakes and return to the United States. Although it is understood that the law was aimed at naturalized American citizens living in Germany, it is unfortunately causing much hardship to innocent and honest Americans living in Latin America.

LEAH BRENNER

Yonkers, N. Y., October 9